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OBSTRUCTING THE BERNARDO INVESTIGATION: KENNETH MURRAY 
AND THE DEFENCE COUNSEL‟S CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS TO 
CLIENTS AND THE COURT  
 
Christopher D. Clemmer* 
 
 
This article focuses on how the investigation and prosecution of Paul 
Bernardo not only exposed one of Ontario‟s most notorious killers but led to 
significant discussion about the legal and ethical obligations faced by 
criminal defence lawyers. Using the example of the prosecution of Kenneth 
Murray, Bernardo‟s lawyer, for obstruction of justice, this paper examines the 
tension that is created between the conflicting duties owed by defence 
lawyers to candor and confidentiality. The limits of confidentiality are 
explored, as is the importance of the solicitor-client relationship to the legal 
system and whether (or when) there is a duty to disclose the possession of 
physical evidence. This paper will ultimately demonstrate that the ethical 
obligations faced by criminal defence counsel are often highly contextual and 
can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. As such, it is important that 
lawyers are provided with adequate guidance on difficult ethical and legal 
situations. However, despite Murray‟s prosecution (and acquittal), defence 
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 On June 29, 1991, the dismembered body of 14-year-old Leslie 
Mahaffy was found encased in concrete in a lake near St. Catharines, 
Ontario. Abducted two weeks earlier, she had been raped before 
being murdered.1 Less than one year later, the naked body of 15-year-
old Kristen French was found in a ditch in Burlington, Ontario, 
having suffered the same fate.2 The investigations that followed not 
only exposed one of Canada‟s most notorious killer couples, but 
eventually thrust Ontario‟s legal community into a divisive argument 
about the ethical and legal obligations of criminal defence lawyers. 
Kenneth Murray, defence counsel for accused killer Paul Bernardo, 
was eventually charged with obstruction of justice for his handling of 
                                                          
1 Report to the Attorney General of Ontario on Certain Matters Relating to Karla 





inculpatory physical evidence while representing his client.3 This 
paper will examine Murray‟s conduct during his representation of 
Bernardo and will discuss the balance that must be struck by a 
criminal defence lawyer when she is faced with the prospect of 
accepting physical evidence from her client. It will then be 
demonstrated that the ethical obligations faced by criminal defence 
counsel are often highly contextual and can only be decided on a case-
by-case basis.  
 To understand Murray‟s actions, it is important to have a 
general understanding of the crimes with which Bernardo had been 
charged, as well as timeline of the case. Accordingly, this paper will 
begin with an account of the crimes of Bernardo and his former wife 
and accomplice Karla Homolka. Essential to this chronology are the 
dates on which Murray viewed the contents of six videotapes 
depicting the rapes and tortures of the eventual murder victims (“the 
tapes”), the date on which Homolka struck her plea bargain with the 
Crown, and the length of time that the tapes were held in Murray‟s 
possession. This timeline will assist in an examination of Murray‟s 
conduct, his subsequent prosecution, and the Law Society of Upper 
Canada (“LSUC”) investigation. 
 Following a summary of the pertinent facts, the obstruction of 
justice charge will be evaluated. The charge will be defined and it will 
be demonstrated that Murray‟s actions satisfy the actus reus of the 
offense. The importance of the videotapes will then be examined and 
their tactical value outlined. It will become clear that Murray did, in 
fact, have legitimate justification for withholding the tapes. Mr. 
Justice Gravely‟s reasons for Murray‟s acquittal on the charge of 
obstruction of justice will be outlined, as will the LSUC‟s decision to 
drop its investigation of the professional misconduct allegations. 
Finally, the rationale behind Murray‟s decision to remove himself 
from the Bernardo case will be outlined. It will ultimately be 
demonstrated that Murray‟s possession of the tapes put him in an 
extremely difficult ethical and legal position. 
 Subsequent to an examination of the obstruction of justice 
allegations, this paper will evaluate the obligations that a criminal 
defence lawyer has to her client. Once a lawyer has been retained 
                                                          




there is a duty upon that lawyer to represent her client with 
undivided loyalty, within the constraints of the law. This paper will 
also demonstrate that this duty includes an inherent obligation to 
avoid judging a client‟s guilt. The duty to observe the instructions of 
the client will then be examined. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated 
that once retained, the criminal defence lawyer must zealously 
represent the interests of her client, subject to few qualifications.  
 Furthermore, this analysis will demonstrate that a criminal 
defence lawyer is bound by an obligation to further the course of 
justice as she defends her client, which prohibits the use of tactics that 
have the effect of misleading the court, explicitly or implicitly. This 
duty to the administration of justice can also restrict solicitor-client 
privilege. The lawyer‟s duty to the administration of justice creates an 
obligation that defines the limits of her duty to her client, but that 
often seems to conflict with that duty.  
 Subsequently, the most fundamental elements of the 
relationship between a criminal defence lawyer and her client – 
solicitor-client privilege and the duty to confidentiality – will be 
examined. The privilege that attaches to most lawyer-client 
discussions results in an obligation on the part of the lawyer to keep in 
the strictest of confidences almost anything that has been said 
between her and her client. This obligation prohibits criminal defence 
lawyers from assisting the Crown‟s case against her client.4 Privilege 
does, however, have limits. For example, the lawyer‟s obligation to 
strict confidentiality does not oblige her to commit or be a party to a 
criminal offense (such as obstructing justice). Moreover, it will be 
shown that some communications have been found to be outside of 
the scope of solicitor-client privilege and the duty to confidentiality. 
Finally, this paper will examine the question of whether privilege can 
extend to physical evidence or whether there is a duty to disclose such 
evidence.  
 Maintaining the integrity of Canada‟s legal system requires a 
delicate balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of 
society. Using this as a foundation for analysis, this paper will examine 
the importance of respecting the basic rights of the accused in a 
criminal proceeding. It is essential that the accused be fully-informed 
                                                          
4 The Crown, however, must fully disclose its case. See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 326, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
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of his rights to defence, which requires largely uninhibited discussion 
with their lawyer. Without absolute trust in confidentiality, it is 
likely that the client will not disclose information that is essential to 
his defence. Additionally, this initial disclosure by the client may 
require the lawyer to take possession of inculpatory evidence. 
Therefore, a lack of trust between the lawyer and client will serve to 
deny the accused of his right to a full defence. Ultimately, it is 
difficult to maintain the integrity of the criminal system if a defence 
lawyer is compelled to break client confidentiality by disclosing 
physical evidence to the authorities even if that is the state of the law 
at present. 
 Much of the controversy surrounding a criminal defence 
lawyer‟s possession of physical evidence relates to whether (or when) 
there is a duty of disclosure. This analysis will discuss when this duty 
exists and will argue that in virtually all situations, a defence lawyer 
does not have an obligation to assist an investigation against her 
client. There is disagreement about a lawyer‟s obligations when she 
comes into possession of inculpatory physical evidence. There seems 
to be a right to withhold physical evidence for a reasonable period of 
time but there is little guidance on this issue, at least from the LSUC. 
As a result, the expectations of criminal defence lawyers in possession 
of inculpatory physical evidence are unclear, although the existing 
jurisprudence can be of assistance in that respect. 
 Having examined a lawyer‟s obligations both to her client and 
the administration of justice, this paper will then examine the tension 
created by these conflicting duties. The fact that a criminal defence 
lawyer is pulled in opposite directions by these duties can make her 
job very difficult. As such, under incredible pressure and with little 
guidance relating to the expectations of defence lawyers, Murray had 
to find a balance. This paper will argue his decision to retain the tapes 
was not entirely unreasonable.  
 As a criminal defence lawyer tries to satisfy her competing 
obligations, guidance from the LSUC is essential. This analysis will 
discuss the importance of guidance on the part of the LSUC in 
maintaining public confidence in the legal profession. Murray‟s 
dilemma was largely the result of the lack of guidance on difficult 
ethical issues from the LSUC, although, admittedly, this problem 
could have been mitigated through a review of the existing 
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jurisprudence relating to the retention of physical evidence.5 
Nevertheless, the rules of the LSUC themselves provided little 
guidance. In the absence of specific professional guidelines, it is 
important for individual lawyers to develop personal ethical codes of 
conduct and review the existing jurisprudence relating to the matter 
at issue. Guiding principles from the LSUC, complemented by 
personal codes, will help to establish a baseline from which defence 
lawyers may work. Lawyers need guidance as they face the conflict 
between duties to the client and to the administration of justice. 
 As a result of the Murray case, the options left to defence 
lawyers in possession of inculpatory physical evidence have been 
significantly limited. This analysis will outline the options provided to 
lawyers in possession of inculpatory physical evidence by Mr. Justice 
Gravely in the Murray decision, which have established a duty to 
disclose and a duty to inform the client of mandated disclosure. The 
LSUC‟s reaction to the Murray decision will then be outlined. The 
need for a revised rule will be established and the LSUC‟s proposed 
rule will be discussed.6 
 This paper will conclude with an examination of the present 
day LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) relevant to the 
issues Murray faced. Despite several revisions, the Rules remain 
ambiguous and provide little guidance for criminal defence lawyers 
facing those same issues. Despite the good intentions behind the 
LSUC‟s proposed rule, criminal defence lawyers are offered little help. 
There is an obvious need to prevent obstruction of justice by 
lawyers. If everything placed in a lawyer‟s hands was protected, 
lawyers‟ offices would become evidence safe houses. Conversely, by 
compelling some types of evidence to be disclosed, the fear that it will 
be disclosed to the Crown is likely to result in the accused being 
denied the opportunity to present to his lawyer evidence that is 
potentially relevant to his defence. This would force an accused 
person to decide what is important to show his lawyer and, as a result, 
would deny him a full, competent legal opinion. In this respect, laws 
compelling the defence to produce physical evidence arguably do so at 
the expense of the accused. Murray highlighted this tension. At the 
                                                          
5 See Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 80, 149. 
6 As will be seen, due to widespread opposition, the proposed rule was never adopted. 
As a result, defence lawyers are again left with very little guidance from the LSUC. 
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time, the only realistic guidance was from case law relating to the 
production of physical evidence and not from the Rules. Without 
adequate guidance and facing competing duties, lawyers are left on 
their own to make difficult and significant ethical decisions. 
 
II 
THE CHRONOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
 To fully appreciate Murray‟s dilemma, it is essential to 
understand the crimes perpetrated by Paul Bernardo. This section of 
the paper will survey the relevant elements of Bernardo‟s crimes in an 
attempt to demonstrate the incredibly difficult circumstances in 
which Murray found himself.  
 On December 24, 1990, an unconscious Tammy Homolka 
choked to death on her own vomit.7 Tammy had been drugged with 
animal tranquilizers by Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka, her older 
sister, so that she could be raped while unconscious.8 Although her 
death was ruled accidental, the string of deaths attributable to 
Bernardo had begun. Six months later, on June 15, 1991, 14-year-old 
Leslie Mahaffy went missing from outside of her Burlington, Ontario 
home. Mahaffy‟s dismembered body was found set in concrete on 
June 29, 1991.9 She had been kidnapped, raped, tortured, and 
murdered by Bernardo and Homolka. On April 16, 1992, 15-year-old 
Kristen French went missing from a church parking lot in St. 
Catharines, Ontario.10 Two weeks later, her naked body was found in 
a ditch in Burlington. French had suffered the same fate as Mahaffy: 
she was abducted, raped, tortured, and murdered by Bernardo and 
Homolka. The rapes and tortures of Tammy Homolka, Kristen French, 
Leslie Mahaffy, and at least two other young women were captured 
                                                          
7  R. v. Bernardo (20 June 1995), Toronto Region (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (Evidence, 
testimony of Karla Homolka Vol. 1 at 165-166). 
8  Ibid. at 175-180. 
9  Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 230. 
10 Ibid. See also Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “In-Depth: Bernardo, 
Bernardo/Homolka Timeline” CBC News In-Depth (21 February 2006), online: 
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bernardo/> [CBC]. 
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on six home videotapes. However, the murders of Mahaffy and 
French do not seem to have been filmed.11 
 In mid-February 1993, after a three year investigation, 
Bernardo was arrested in relation to a string of violent rapes that took 
place in Scarborough, east of Toronto.12 Kenneth Murray, a criminal 
defence lawyer from Newmarket, was retained by Bernardo to defend 
these charges.13 On February 19, police executed a search warrant of 
Bernardo and Homolka‟s St. Catharines home which, despite lasting 
for 71-days, failed to produce the tapes.14 On May 6, after the 
expiration of the warrant, Murray, Carolyn MacDonald (co-counsel), 
and Kim Doyle (office manager and law clerk) were given 
unsupervised access to the home by Bernardo‟s landlord to retrieve his 
personal belongings.15 While in the home, Bernardo gave Murray 
specific instructions (over a cellular telephone) as to the location of 
the tapes, which were above a ceiling light fixture in an upstairs 
bathroom.16 Bernardo instructed that although they would view the 
tapes in the future, Murray was not to view them. Murray would keep 
the tapes for 17 months.17 
 On May 14, Homolka, a suspect in the murders of French and 
Mahaffy, agreed to a plea bargain in exchange for her testimony 
against Bernardo.18 The Crown had very little evidence to use in 
Bernardo‟s murder prosecution; Homolka‟s testimony was essential.19 
                                                          
11 Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 230; French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General) 
[1996] O.J. No. 1300 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 587 at para. 2 (cited to O.J.) 
12 CBC, supra note 10; Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 233. 
13Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 1, 4-5.  
14 Ibid. at para. 6.  
15 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 6.  
16 Ibid. at para. 10. 
17 Ibid. at para. 85a.  
18 The negotiations leading up to the agreement began on February 12, 1993 and 
lasted for three months. See Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 52. For a copy of the 
plea arrangement between Crown Attorney Murray Segal and Defence Lawyer 
George Walker, see Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 240-246. 
19 In his Report on Homolka‟s plea agreement, Justice Galligan claimed that “by the 
end of April [1993], the case against Paul Bernardo had not advanced at all. None of 
[the DNA] evidence was by then available. The videotapes had not been found. The 
search warrants expired on April 30, 1993 and all of the inquiries and investigations 
had not led the police a step closer to Paul Bernardo. The only way to him was 
through Karla Homolka…The authorities were faced with the unpleasant fact that 
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As a result, she was offered an extremely attractive plea bargain:  
instead of two counts of first-degree murder, she would plead guilty to 
two counts of manslaughter, resulting in a 12-year sentence.20 
Sometime during May 14-17, Murray learned about Homolka‟s 
completed plea bargain (although no details about the terms). On May 
18, the day that Bernardo was charged with the first-degree murders 
of French and Homolka, Bernardo authorized Murray to watch the 
tapes.21 Sometime later in the month, he rented copying equipment 
and duplicated the tapes, but did not bill the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, 
concerned that this would alert the prosecution to the existence of the 
tapes.22 On July 6, with the tapes still safely in Murray‟s possession, 
Homolka pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter, and was 
sentenced to a 12-year prison term. The details of her plea 
arrangement and her statement of facts were restricted by a court-
ordered publication ban.23 The plea bargain was completed and the 
tapes remained a secret. 
 In August 1994, Murray, for various reasons, asked defence 
lawyer John Rosen to take over the Bernardo case, to which Rosen 
hesitantly agreed.24 On September 2, through lawyer Austin Cooper, 
Murray wrote to the LSUC to ask for advice on what to do with the 
tapes.25 The LSUC‟s September 8 response, signed by the ad hoc 
committee of Earl Levy Q.C., Paul Copeland, and Colin Campbell 
Q.C., instructed that the tapes be turned over to the trial judge, 
Murray be removed from the case, and Bernardo be immediately 
notified.26 Although the tapes were passed over to Rosen on 
September 12, he was uncomfortable with the prospect of 
surrendering the tapes before being able to evaluate them and 
ascertain their significance. That day, Murray was removed as counsel 
and LeSage A.C.J.O.C. ruled that Rosen was allowed to retain the 
tapes until October 7, with the understanding that he would “deal 
                                                                                                                                  
if Paul Bernardo was to be prosecuted for those offenses, it was essential that they 
have Karla Homolka‟s evidence and co-operation.” [emphasis added]. Ibid. at 76. 
20 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 15. 
21 Ibid. at para. 16. 
22 Ibid. at para. 29. 
23 R. v. Bernardo [1994] O.J. No. 4119 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div)) at paras. 7, 9, 12; Galligan 
Report, supra note 1 at 101. 
24 Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 50-54. 
25 Ibid. at para. 2. 
26 Ibid. at para. 70. 
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ethically, legally and professionally with [them] and would preserve 
[their] integrity.”27 Although in Rosen‟s subsequent meetings with the 
Crown he maintained that he had no ethical or legal obligation to 
surrender the tapes, Bernardo instructed that the tapes be turned over 
to the Crown.28 On September 22, the tapes were delivered to 
representatives of the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara 
Regional Police.29  
 Bernardo was found guilty of all charges against him and was 
sentenced to 25-years in prison on 1 September 1995.30 In January 
1997, Kenneth Murray was charged with obstructing justice, 
conspiracy to obstruct justice, possessing child pornography and 
making obscene materials for withholding and copying the tapes.31 
The latter two charges were later dropped by the Crown.32 Murray‟s 
co-counsel, Carolyn MacDonald, was also charged with obstructing 
justice and possession of child pornography, although the charges 
against MacDonald were dropped in May 1997.33 In March 2000, 
Murray unsuccessfully sought a stay of proceedings by claiming that 
his “to a trial within a reasonable time as guaranteed by s. 11(b) of the 
Charter has been infringed by both pre and post-charge delay”, the 
latter delay lasted for 38-months.34 
In February, the LSUC served Murray with professional 
misconduct complaints, the hearing for which was delayed until after 
his criminal trial.35 No complaint of professional misconduct was 
made against MacDonald.36 On June 13, 2000, Murray was acquitted 
of the criminal charges against him. Gravely J held that “Murray's 
                                                          
27 Ibid. at para. 74. 
28 Ibid. at para. 82, 84. 
29 Ibid. at para. 85. 
30 Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 239; R. v. Bernardo (1995) Toronto (Ont. Ct. J. 
(Gen. Div)). 
31 R. v. Murray, [2000] O.J. No. 1365, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 746 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) at para. 
3 [cited to O.J.] 
32 Ibid. at Appendix A. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. at paras. 1, 8. 
35 The Law Society of Upper Canada (Professional Regulation Committee), Press 
Release, “Charges of professional misconduct against Kenneth Murray withdrawn” 
(29 November 2000), online: LSUC 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/nov2900Kennethmurray.pdf [LSUC Committee]. 
36 Beth Gorham, “Bernardo lawyer faces censure over graphic videotapes” The Calgary 
Herald  (22  February 1997) A15 [Gorham]. 
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testimony…raises a reasonable doubt as to his intention to obstruct 
justice.”37 Similarly, on November 29, 2000, the LSUC withdrew the 
charges of professional misconduct and Robert P. Armstrong Q.C., 
then the Treasurer of the LSUC, promised the appointment of a 
special committee to “devise a proposed rule of professional conduct 
to provide guidance to lawyers who may be faced with similar issues 
in the future.”38 The proposed rule, which will subsequently be 
examined, was not adopted by the LSUC. In December 2001, the tapes 
depicting the torture and rape of Bernardo and Homolka‟s victims 
were finally destroyed.39 Murray had escaped from the Bernardo 
ordeal without any sanction.  
 Murray‟s conduct during the Bernardo case raised questions of 
fundamental importance for criminal defence lawyers who take 
possession of incriminating physical evidence. The history of the 
Murray ordeal demonstrates that Ontario‟s professional guidelines 
relating to this issue were, and continue to be, woefully inadequate. 
Unfortunately, despite the controversy brought on by the Murray 
case, little has changed.  
 
III 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
 Obstruction of justice is an extremely serious offense. Canada‟s 
Criminal Code outlines that “everyone who wilfully attempts…to 
obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding ten years.”40 This is the offense with which Kenneth 
Murray was charged for his role in secreting away the inculpatory 
tapes in the Bernardo case.41, As is clear from the jurisprudence 
relating to the offence of obstructing justice42, to be convicted of 
obstruction of justice, the accused must have done some act which 
                                                          
37 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 154. 
38 LSUC Committee, supra note 35. 
39 CBC, supra note 10. 
40 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.139(2). 
41 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 85a. 
42 See e.g. R. v. May (1984), 13 C.C.C.(3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.) at 260, R. v. Kirkham 
(1998), 126 C.C.C.(3d) 397 at 411 (Sask. Q.B.). 
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tends to pervert the course of justice, with the specific intention of 
perverting the course of justice.43  
Although it may be necessary for a criminal defence lawyer to 
take possession of physical evidence to defend her client, according to 
University of Victoria Law Professor David Layton and defence 
lawyer Michel Proulx, it would be an offense for a defence lawyer 
“even temporarily to remove evidence of a crime for the purposes of 
preventing seizure by the police.”44 Similarly, Layton and Proulx add 
that the defence cannot “actively impede a police investigation.”45 
Neither ethical considerations nor solicitor-client privilege could ever 
permit a lawyer to break the law or be a party to the law being broken 
in this manner.46 Clearly, criminal defence lawyers must carefully 
consider conduct that runs the risk of obstructing the course of 
justice. 
 Murray‟s conduct obstructed the course of justice as it related 
to Homolka.47 Shortly after Murray came into possession of the tapes, 
Homolka entered into a plea bargain with the Crown which, until 
then, had very little evidence against Bernardo.48 The consensus 
amongst those who thought that Murray had done wrong was that 
had the prosecution been in possession of the tapes, the need for 
Homolka‟s testimony against Bernardo would have been greatly 
diminished. As a result, Homolka‟s extremely lenient plea bargain 
would never have been offered.49 According to the Honourable 
Patrick Galligan, who conducted the official inquiry into Homolka‟s 
plea bargain, “if the videotapes had been in the hands of the 
authorities on or before May 14, 1993, the Crown would never have 
                                                          
43 Lucinda Vandervort, “Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A „Bad 
Excuse‟…Even For a Lawyer” (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 171 at 174 [Vandervort]. 
44 David Layton and Michel Proulx, Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2001) at 495 [Layton]. 
45 Ibid. at 490. 
46 Earl A. Cherniak, “Ethics of Advocacy” (1985) 19 L. Soc‟y Gaz. 147 at 147 
[Cherniak]. 
47 In his trial, it was found that Murray‟s conduct had satisfied the actus reus of the 
offense of obstructing justice. Murray, supra note 3 at para. 100. 
48 Anothony DePalma, “Murderer‟s Sex Tapes Put Canadian Lawyer at Risk” The New 
York Times (27 February 1997) A4 [DePalma]. 
49 Peter M. Brauti & Gena Argitis, “Possession of Evidence by Counsel: Ontario‟s 
Proposed Solution” (2003) 47 Crim. L.Q. 211 at 219 [Brauti]. 
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entered into the [plea] agreement with Karla Homolka.”50 He added 
that after conducting extensive interviews, “all of the persons who 
were involved told me that if the videotapes had been available at the 
time, Karla Homolka would have found herself in the prisoner‟s box 
beside Paul Bernardo.”51 Similarly, according to Dan Mahaffy, Leslie‟s 
father, “had the tapes been turned over to the police, Karla wouldn‟t 
have been able to plea bargain and she‟d be serving a first-degree 
murder term with Bernardo.”52 Bernardo‟s lead prosecutor Ray 
Houlahan echoed this opinion.53 Interestingly, despite his apparent 
centrality to Homolka‟s plea arrangement, Kenneth Murray was not 
interviewed during the nearly four-month inquiry conducted by the 
Honourable Patrick Galligan.54 
In Murray‟s trial, Gravely J held that “the tapes were the 
products and instrumentalities of crime and were far more potent 
„hard evidence‟ than the often-mentioned „smoking gun‟ and „bloody 
shirt.‟”  Their concealment, he added, “had the potential to infect all 
aspects of the criminal justice system.”55 Had Murray not secreted the 
tapes, Homolka would have been charged with two counts of first-
degree murder, not the two counts of manslaughter to which she pled 
guilty. The implication, according to Assistant Crown Attorney 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 89. Galligan claimed that “in addition to providing 
extensive detail about the matters under investigation, Karla Homolka gave the 
police a vital piece of information. Until that time, the police had no evidence 
other than Karla Homolka directly connecting Paul Bernardo to either Leslie 
Mahaffy or Kristen French. During the course of the induced interview, Karla 
Homolka provided the police with some information which enabled the police to 
make a direct link between Paul Bernardo and the dead body of Leslie Mahaffy.” 
Moreover, he adds: “It is my firm conclusion that, distasteful as it always is to 
negotiate with an accomplice, the Crown had no alternative but to do so in this 
case…It is, as Dan Mahaffy put it, the „lesser of two evils‟ to deal with an 
accomplice rather than to be left in a situation where a violent and dangerous 
offender cannot be prosecuted…The public interest demanded that Paul Bernardo 
be prosecuted for murder. I do not see how it could have been responsible to delay 
the institution of that prosecution to some uncertain time in the future on the hope 
that some evidence might turn up which would make Karla Homolka‟s testimony 
unnecessary.” Ibid. at 94, 111. 
52 Gorham, supra note 36.  
53 Alan Cairns & Scott Burnside, “Ken Murray‟s tale of the tapes” Law Times (23 
October 1995) 1 [Cairns].  
54 See Galligan Report, supra note 1 at Appendix A. 
55 Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 109, 111. 
150 
 
Matthew Humphreys, is that when you discover the evidence and you 
are blind to its contents, you have an obligation to make the evidence 
known.56 Murray, having failed in this obligation, had obstructed the 
course of justice. 
 Criminally charging a defence lawyer with obstruction of 
justice for withholding evidence is an uncommon reaction. According 
to Austin Cooper, Murray‟s counsel, there has never been a successful 
criminal prosecution of a defence lawyer for holding onto physical 
evidence.57 University of Ottawa Law Professor David Paciocco had 
also never heard of such a prosecution, adding that “it‟s extremely 
unusual for the Criminal Code to be used against the [defence] 
counsel for attempting to defend their clients.”58 However, despite its 
unconventionality, obstruction of justice charges proceeded against 
Murray. 
 
A. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE TAPES 
According to Murray‟s testimony, the tapes formed an 
essential part of Bernardo‟s defence and his strategy required their 
concealment.59 When the tapes were discovered, it was thought that 
they were a “„bonanza‟ or „gold mine‟” for the defence.60 Murray 
immediately made a pact with Doyle and MacDonald, swearing them 
to secrecy.61 According to Murray, the tapes had tremendous tactical 
value, who claimed that the Crown was going to portray Homolka as 
“a shrinking, abused wife under the control of Bernardo” – merely a 
“manipulated victim.”62 The benefit of the tapes to the defence, 
however, “was not just that Homolka could be shown as a liar, but 
also as a person capable of committing murder.”63 One tape shows 
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Homolka administering tranquilizers to her sister and another girl, 
then participating in the sexual assaults on both of them, while others 
show her involvement in the rape and torture of Mahaffy and French. 
The tapes did not show a cowering, fearful Homolka, but an 
enthusiastic participant in the sexual assaults.64 At Murray‟s trial, 
Cooper said the tapes gave Bernardo a slim chance. Although making 
Bernardo look bad, the tapes also made Homolka look equally bad.65 
Bernardo had admitted to the sex-related crimes but had denied 
killing Mahaffy or French and the tapes supported such a theory as a 
possibility. Ultimately, as Gravely J held in the trial, “Murray's alleged 
plan to use the tapes… is not unfeasible.”66  
The tactical value of the tapes, however, would have been 
greatly diminished if the Crown were to have been given the 
opportunity to prepare Homolka for cross-examination.67 Murray 
claimed that the tapes would be used either after the preliminary trial, 
in an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain for Bernardo, or at trial to 
undermine the credibility of the Crown‟s star witness (Homolka) and 
introduce doubt as to who had murdered Mahaffy and French.68 Both 
uses required that the prosecution be surprised with the tapes at trial. 
If the tapes could be used to undermine Homolka, it is reasonable to 
believe that Murray could and should have used them in Bernardo‟s 
defence.  
Despite the potential benefit the tapes had for Bernardo‟s 
defence, there is a real argument that Bernardo would have been 
better served had the tapes never come out. Murray‟s admitted 
strategy for employing the tapes was to introduce them to show how 
bad they made Homolka look. Thus, it follows that the tapes would 
serve to make Bernardo look equally bad – likely to his detriment 
during a jury trial for a crime that had already seen one of the 
perpetrators agree to a lenient plea bargain. As Gravely J identified 
during Murray‟s trial, the tapes were “damning evidence” and quoted 
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Rosen in holding that the any jury that viewed the tapes “would have 
convicted him of sinking the Titanic.” Bernardo‟s case, Gravely J 
added, “would have been in a substantially better position if the tapes 
had never surfaced.”69  
Kitchener, Ontario-based criminal defence lawyer Randall 
Martin also had trouble understanding Murray‟s decision to introduce 
the tapes in Bernardo‟s defence. “Why would he introduce those tapes 
at all?” Martin asked, adding that “showing those films wouldn‟t 
strengthen his case,” but rather “the tapes were certainly going to hurt 
Bernardo‟s case.”70 Similarly, Gravely J held that the tapes “provide 
strong circumstantial evidence to prove Bernardo guilty of the 
murders.”71 University of British Columbia Associate Law Professor 
Janine Benedet agrees, claiming that the tapes were “an evidentiary 
record of the accused committing at least part of what he has been 
charged with.”72 Introducing the tapes in Bernardo‟s defence, 
therefore, was a risky proposition. 
In a subsequent civil case by the estate of Kristen French 
against the Ontario government, Moldaver J.A. claimed that in “the 
Bernardo criminal trial, the videotapes played a central, if not crucial 
role, in bringing Bernardo to justice. The tapes formed some of the 
most cogent and damning evidence against Bernardo and their value 
in his successful prosecution cannot be overstated.”73 Ultimately, 
despite the fact that the use of the tapes was questionable, Murray‟s 
belief that they could introduce reasonable doubt to the charges of 
first degree murder helped establish his defence to the obstruction of 
justice charge. 
 
B. MURRAY‟S CASE FOR WITHHOLDING THE TAPES 
At the time of his decision, it was possible that Murray had a 
justifiable reason for withholding the tapes. Prior to and following the 
                                                          
69 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 134. 
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72 Interview of Janine Benedet, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 
British Columbia (2 November 2007) [“Benedet Interview”]. 
73 French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1998] O.J. No. 752, 38 O.R. (3d) 347 
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plea agreement, repeated requests for notes from Crown deal-maker 
Murray Segal and Homolka‟s lawyer, George Walker, were ignored. It 
was not until six months after the deal had been struck that Murray 
was provided with some of the details of the plea arrangement.74 The 
full details of the plea arrangement were not provided until disclosure 
was ordered by the Ontario Court of Justice on May 10, 1994.75 At the 
time of the plea negotiations, Murray had not watched the content of 
the tapes.76 Had Murray been provided with the details of the plea 
arrangement before the deal was completed, he would have been in a 
better position to avoid the possibility of obstructing justice, perhaps 
by requesting Bernardo‟s permission to view the tapes and then 
turning them over if he deemed it necessary. Moreover, when the 
deal was being negotiated, Murray believed that the Crown knew 
about some of the tapes‟ contents. During their investigation, the 
police had seized portions of the video from Bernardo‟s briefcase, 
which showed Homolka willingly involved in sexual acts.77 As will be 
subsequently discussed, Murray had a genuine belief that there was no 
duty to turn the tapes over to the Crown.  
As was stated by Cooper at the time of Murray‟s trial, 
“anybody who thinks [defence] lawyers are supposed to further the 
hunt for the truth in a criminal case is misled.”78 He added that 
“lawyers may quite justifiably tear apart Crown witnesses, decline to 
turn over material that harms their clients and force the Crown to 
prove its case” and that defence lawyers are often required “to do 
certain things that obstruct the course of justice and obstruct a 
prosecution.”79 In a vernacular sense, Cooper seems to have been 
indicating that defense lawyers often do things that do not assist the 
Crown and that may impede fact-finding in an effort to build a full 
defense for her client. 
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C. ACQUITTAL AND PROFESSIONAL SANCTION 
With little doubt that Murray‟s actions tended towards the 
obstruction of justice, his fate with respect to the criminal trial hinged 
on one word: wilfully. This word, held Gravely J, denotes a specific 
intent offense and thus, the onus was on the Crown to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Murray, in suppressing the tapes, intended to 
obstruct justice.80 Gravely J did not find that the Crown had proven its 
case. “The context of the whole of the evidence,” Gravely J held, 
“raises a reasonable doubt as to his intention to obstruct justice.”81 
Murray did not have the requisite mens rea for the offense and 
therefore, had to be found not guilty of obstruction of justice. This 
conclusion, however, was not well-received by some in the academic 
community. Associate Professor Benedet, for example, commented 
during an interview for this paper that Gravely J “fiddles with the 
mens rea of the charge…and [he] kind of slides mistake of law and 
mistake of fact together in a way that I don‟t find convincing.”82 
Benedet, who thinks that Murray intended to suppress the tapes 
permanently, felt that Gravely J did not want Murray to be the “fall 
guy” for a systemic problem that was “bigger than Murray.”83 Despite 
the dissent, Murray‟s belief that he was acting within the confines of 
the law won out. 
Murray‟s acquittal, however, did not signal the end of his 
troubles. Murray still faced the threat of sanction by the LSUC, which 
had served him with a professional misconduct complaint in February 
1997.84 It was asserted that contrary to Rule 2.02(5), Murray has 
become “the tool or dupe of his unscrupulous client”85 and that he 
failed to look at the contents of the tapes to decide whether they 
should have been disclosed to the police.86 Defence lawyer Randall 
Martin explains that this was because he “allowed himself to be…used 
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by his client.”87 The hearing for the claims was deferred until the 
conclusion of Murray‟s criminal trial.88 In November 2000, six months 
after Murray‟s criminal acquittal, the LSUC dropped the professional 
misconduct charges.89 According to the LSUC Press Release, the 
Proceedings Authorization Committee gave Gravely J‟s decision 
significant deference, concluding that “the public interest would be 
better served by the clarification of lawyers‟ professional 
responsibilities when confronted with such a dilemma than by the 
continuation of disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Murray.”90 
Robert P. Armstrong, Q.C., then the head of the LSUC, announced 
the appointment of a committee to consider the issues arising from 
the Murray case and to draft a proposal for a new rule to guide 
lawyers who face similar dilemmas in the future. 91 Murray had 
emerged from the Bernardo affair having escaped from both criminal 
and professional sanction. 
 
D. MURRAY‟S REMOVAL FROM BERNARDO 
Murray‟s suppression of the tapes ultimately led to his 
decision to remove himself from the Bernardo case. As explained by 
Associate Professor Benedet, a lawyer who takes possession of 
physical evidence risks becoming a witness in her client‟s case.92 
Murray would have likely been removed from the case from the very 
beginning, when he first took possession of the tapes from Bernardo‟s 
house. When a lawyer comes into possession of physical evidence, 
Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys explains, the source of the 
evidence becomes important, making the lawyer a witness who is 
subject to cross-examination by the Crown. “You need to find out 
where the evidence came from,” says Humphreys, adding that “if the 
accused walks in and hands the defence a bloody shirt, that is pretty 
strong evidence.”93 Defence lawyer Randall Martin agrees, claiming 
that “often where the evidence came from is very important.”94 
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Benedet, Humphreys, and Martin all agree that because of his 
possession of evidence, Murray should have removed himself from the 
case.  
Murray became uncomfortable when he visited Bernardo on 
July 11-12, 1994, when Bernardo told him was going to deny ever 
having met Mahaffy or French and that Murray was not to contradict 
this position.95 The implication was obvious: Murray was to 
permanently suppress the tapes. As a result, Murray asked John Rosen 
to take over the Bernardo case in August 1994.96 On September 1, 
Murray contacted the office of Austin Cooper for help in removing 
himself from the case.97 Cooper wrote to the Professional Conduct 
Committee of the LSUC and was sent the following instructions by 
Earl Levy Q.C., Paul Copeland, and Colin Campbell Q.C.:  
(1)  Mr. Murray should remove himself as counsel 
of record for Mr. Bernardo as soon as 
practicable. 
(2)  Certain material in possession of Mr. Murray 
should be delivered to His Honour Judge P. 
LeSage in a sealed packet and to be subject to 
court determination. 
(3)  We are of the view that Mr. Bernardo should 
be advised of the steps you intend to take as 
soon as possible.98 
 
Murray and Rosen followed the instructions. On September 12, Rosen 
took possession of the tapes, and LeSage A.C.J.O.C. ruled that Rosen 
could retain the tapes until October 7.99 Murray was also removed 
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THE DUTY TO CLIENTS 
 
 Once retained, a defence lawyer assumes several fundamental 
duties to that client, which form the basis of the lawyer-client 
relationship. The most obvious duty that a lawyer owes to her client is 
the obligation to represent the client resolutely. In cases like 
Bernardo, representing clients who have been accused of horrible acts 
can cause a considerable ethical dilemma. However, once retained, a 
lawyer must suspend such reservations in order to fully defend her 
client. 
The belief in a lawyer‟s duty to represent her client fully and 
loyally is significant. “No matter how notorious [Mr. Bernardo] was 
and how egregious his crimes were,” Cooper explains, “under our 
system he is entitled to good counsel that will defend him to the best 
of their ability.”100 Similarly, Toronto-area lawyers Stephen Grant and 
Linda Rothstein identify that a lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary 
and thus, the lawyer must represent the client “with undivided 
loyalty.”101 Admittedly, a fiduciary obligation can only license legal 
behavior and cannot render legally-permissible what is not otherwise 
allowed. In a criminal trial, Gavin Mackenzie adds, this includes a 
“duty is to protect the client as far as possible from being convicted 
except by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction and upon legal evidence 
sufficient to support a conviction for the offence with which the 
client is charged.”102 Mackenzie continues by saying that “it is the 
professional responsibility of the [defence] counsel in many cases to 
prevent the whole truth from coming out by all lawful means,” 
allowing for reliance on legal techniques that are not known to be 
fraudulent or false.103 This forms an essential part of the criminal 
adversarial process and, according to Justice Finlayson in R. v. 
Lomage, the role of the “[defence] counsel is every bit as important as 
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that of any other party to the proceedings.”104 Murray seems to have 
embraced this duty, later explaining that “my responsibility was to my 
client…and to present the best defence available to him.”105 Such a 
defence, he contended, necessitated suppression of the tapes until 
they could be used in cross-examination against Homolka.106 Assistant 
Crown Attorney Humphreys suggests that although the tapes do 
depict the murders, they show that Bernardo was guilty of a “whole 
host of things” and invite strong inferences that Bernardo may have 
committed the murders.107 As a result, Bernardo needed a strong 
defence for the charges of first-degree murder. Murray‟s strategy was 
an attempt to honour his duties to his client. 
 
A. THE DUTY NOT TO JUDGE 
In a criminal context, it is essential that a lawyer defend her 
client without passing judgment on his guilt or innocence. Thus, it is 
important that the defence lawyer reconciles her ethics with the oft-
asked question: “how can you defend someone who you know to be 
guilty?”108 This question is often asked with disgust, many people 
feeling that defence lawyers are “worse than the criminals [they] 
represent” because “[they] know better.”109 According to Professor 
Barbara Babcock of the Stanford Law Society, however, most defence 
lawyers are indifferent to the question.110 Martin Erdmann, former 
head of the Supreme Court branch of New York City‟s Legal Aid 
Society, clarifies, adding that defence lawyers “have nothing to do 
with justice. Justice is not even a part of the equation.”111 He adds that 
justice is for the courts, not the defence counsel, to determine. 
Echoing this statement, defence lawyer Randall Martin adds that 
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“whether the accused is lying to me or not is not my judgment to 
make.”112  
Criminal defence lawyers, it would seem, neither “believe nor 
disbelieve their clients, but are in the neutral state of non-belief.”113 
By representing clients who they know or believe to be guilty, 
Mackenzie feels that defence lawyers are upholding, not offending, 
their professional duties.114 In criminal trials, the duty of a lawyer not 
to judge her client is essential – and the same has been true for 
centuries. Dr. Samuel Johnson, an 18th century English writer claimed 
that “in Western democracies…it is no part of defense [sic] lawyers‟ 
function to determine whether their clients are guilty.”115 The 
understanding of defence counsel‟s function has transcended the 
centuries and forms an important part of the lawyer-client 
relationship, without which defendants would be denied the 
opportunity to secure a full legal defence. 
 
B. OBSERVING THE CLIENT‟S INSTRUCTIONS 
The final important obligation on the part of a lawyer to her 
client is a duty to observe his instructions, if they are legal, ethical, 
and pertain to the defence. Such a duty, many would suggest, is where 
Murray‟s strategy became problematic. As the client‟s advocate, 
defence lawyers are subject to the instructions of a client, within 
certain limits. According to Austin Cooper, if a defence lawyer gets 
instructions that something should be used to benefit the defence, “he 
neglects those instructions at his own risk.”116 Cooper added that had 
Murray ignored Bernardo‟s instructions and the tapes were destroyed 
with the house, “Murray would have to be concerned about 
allegations of incompetence. He didn‟t have any choice.”117  
Murray‟s instructions from Bernardo in relation to the tapes 
were very clear. Through a note, Bernardo instructed that “we will 
have to go through them in the future. At this time I instruct you not 
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to view them.”118 Once Murray had decided to retrieve the tapes, he 
was not at liberty to disobey Bernardo‟s instructions. According to 
some, this is where Murray made his fundamental mistake. Randall 
Martin suggests that Murray could have “refused the instructions from 
the accused” and Bernardo could have discharged his lawyer. Martin 
feels that Murray allowed himself to be taken advantage of by 
Bernardo, as lawyers cannot “take blind instructions from a client.”119 
Associate Professor Benedet agrees, claiming that “if Bernardo tells 
Murray that there were tapes in the house, he does not have an 
obligation to call the police. Nor does he have an obligation to go and 
get the tapes. He should have left them alone.”120 Loyally adhering to 




THE DUTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
 
 Although having no “generalized duty to justice,”121 as 
“officers of the court”122 there are certain elements of the 
administration of justice to which defence lawyers are bound. 
According to University of Alberta Law Professor Wayne Renke, 
lawyers have a duty to “promote the course of justice.”123 Lawyers are 
not required to disclose every detail in an all-out search for the truth, 
but must respect the administration of justice. As will be discussed, 
this expectation likely means that lawyers cannot deceive the court by 
lying or offering evidence that they know to be false. Similarly, as the 
Murray ordeal confirmed, lawyers may not obstruct the course of 
justice nor have involvement in any other illegal activities.  
The Rules set out the expectations relating to the duty to 
justice but provide little guidance; individual lawyers must determine 
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how to act in the furtherance of justice. Assistant Crown Attorney 
Humphreys explains that for defence lawyers, there are two levels at 
which a lawyer has to operate: “everyone has a duty to society at one 
level. At another level, there is a duty to the client and the Law 
Society.”124 The challenge, he asserts, is for a defence lawyer to 
“decide how this meshes with [her] personal ethics.”125 He notes that 
in an ideal world, the duty to the administration of justice would force 
defence lawyers to disclose all relevant evidence to the Crown. He 
concludes, however, that complete disclosure could only be mandated 
“if the sole purpose of the criminal process is to get to what the truth 
is.”126 The challenge for a defence lawyer is to determine how she will 
satisfy her duty to the administration of justice without jeopardizing 
her client‟s interests. 
Although many of the LSUC‟s contemporary expectations 
relating to the administration of justice were unclear, lawyers must 
not deceive the court. It is obvious that a lawyer cannot lie to a 
court127 nor can she introduce evidence that she knows to be false 
because of his client‟s admissions.128 Similarly, the Rules prohibit a 
lawyer from knowingly assisting or permitting her clients to do 
anything that she sees as being dishonourable or dishonest.129 The 
alternative for a lawyer is to put her client on the stand and argue the 
case based on his testimony. Before doing this, the lawyer should 
discourage the client from lying by advising that false testimony can 
result in prosecution for perjury and, if discovered, will act to the 
detriment of the client‟s case.130 Randall Martin suggests that although 
you cannot put the client on the stand knowing that they are going to 
lie, “you can sure put him on the stand thinking that he is going to lie” 
because “every once in a while you are wrong about what you 
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think.”131 Thus, the defence lawyer must help the client “polish their 
story” but must not “change the gist of it.”132 Therefore, it is to the 
lawyer‟s advantage to know as little as possible about the client‟s guilt. 
“[When] you know that he did whatever he was charged with, you 
can no longer make certain representations,” Humphreys explains, 
adding that once a defence lawyer “knows [her client] did it, [the 
lawyer] cannot go into the courtroom and say that [he] didn‟t do it.”133 
Ultimately, the overarching point being made by the example of 
client testimony is that lawyers have an unqualified duty to be candid 
with the court. 
As officers of the court, lawyers have a duty to the 
administration of justice. Although the current ethical and legal 
guidelines are vague, they frame the outer limits as to what is 
considered to be acceptable conduct on the part of lawyers. Defence 
lawyers have no ethical or legal commitment to the search for the 
truth. They are, however, bound by rules that demand honesty and 
respect for the court, specifically prohibiting lawyers from engaging 
in dishonest tactics before the court. A failure to obey these duties 
places a lawyer in danger of professional sanction or criminal 
conviction. Therefore, in representing Bernardo, Murray was 
prohibited from falsely representing his client. This created a problem 
when, in mid-July 1994, Murray was instructed to deny that Bernardo 
had ever been in contact with Mahaffy or French.134 The tapes, 
Bernardo dictated, were not to contradict this position.135 Situations 
like this leave defence lawyers in an extremely difficult position. The 
ambiguity of the rules relating to the duty to justice has resulted in 
varying interpretations of what is expected of lawyers, as was 
highlighted by the Murray case. Ultimately, the duty to the 
administration of justice forms one of the two tensions pulling 
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THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND ITS LIMITS 
  Perhaps the single most difficult issue facing Murray in the 
Bernardo case related to Murray‟s duty of confidentiality not to 
disclose privileged communications between himself and his client. In 
R. v. Solosky, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that “the 
concept of privileged communications between a solicitor and his 
client has long been recognized as fundamental to the due 
administration of justice.”136 This privilege, the Court held, “protects 
communications between solicitor and client.”137 Similarly, lawyers 
Stephen Grant and Linda Rothstein claim that as a part of a lawyer‟s 
fiduciary relationship with her client, a lawyer must preserve her 
client‟s confidences, requiring rigorous protection of the client‟s 
secrets.138 They add that “it is not only information furnished to a 
lawyer by a client that is confidential: all information received on 
behalf of a client in a professional capacity is confidential.”139 Lawyer 
Rachel Fogl feels that “privilege attaches to all communications made 
within the ambit of the solicitor-client relationship,” beginning from 
when the client first approaches the lawyer.140 As will be argued 
below, a client‟s confidence in his lawyer‟s commitment to 
confidentiality is essential to his right to defend against criminal 
allegations. 
Murray defended his dealings with Bernardo by claiming that 
“lawyers are required to keep absolutely confidential all 
communications with their clients and are under no obligation to turn 
over incriminating evidence.”141 Professor Renke agrees, claiming that 
“Bernardo had the right to expect that his communications with his 
lawyer would not be disclosed, and Murray was entitled not to 
disclose his communications with Bernardo to anyone.”142 Therefore, 
Murray‟s belief in his duty to maintain confidentiality is of central 
                                                          
136 R. v. Solosky, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 at 829, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 495 [cited to S.C.R.]. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Grant, supra note 101 at 32 & 40. 
139 Ibid. at 41. 
140 Rachel Fogl, “Sex, Laws and Videotape: The Ambit of Solicitor-Client Privilege in 
Canadian Criminal Law as Illuminated in R. v. Murray” (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 188 at 
201 [Fogl]. 
141 DePalma, supra note 48. 
142 Renke, supra note 122 at 197. 
164 
 
importance to his ordeal. However, this also seems to be the source of 
much of the controversy regarding Murray‟s decision to withhold the 
physical evidence.  
Implicit in the duty to maintain confidentiality is a duty to 
avoid doing anything that would help the case against a lawyer‟s 
client. In Szarfer v. Chodos, Callaghan A.C.J.O. held that “the 
fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and his client forbids a lawyer 
from using any confidential information obtained by him for the 
benefit of himself…or to the disadvantage of his client” (emphasis in 
original).143 Thus, as is suggested by Associate Professor Benedet, the 
duty to confidentiality prohibits the provision of any aid to the 
Crown, unless compelled by the law.144 The duty of confidentiality 
forces a lawyer to protect communications with her client and 
removes any duty to help the prosecution of her client. The 
protections afforded to solicitor-client privilege and by extension to 
the duty of confidentiality are not, however, absolute. 
 
A. LIMITS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE DUTY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality arising out of solicitor-client privilege can be 
limited in several ways. Perhaps the most obvious limitation is that 
such confidentiality cannot extend to a situation from which a crime 
would result. For example, privilege does not attach to an instruction 
to handle evidence in a manner that itself would constitute a criminal 
offense.145 In Murray‟s case, privilege would not attach if Bernardo 
asked Murray to retrieve and destroy the tapes to prevent their 
seizure by investigators. Similarly, privilege does not attach to the 
client‟s announced intention to commit a crime.146 In the evidence 
destruction example, privilege would not attach if Bernardo had 
indicated his plans to have the tapes destroyed. Ultimately, according 
to lawyer Norman Lefstein, privilege cannot be applied if the lawyer 
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would be a party to a crime.147 In Murray, Gravely J held that the 
tapes were not protected by confidentiality or privilege.148 Therefore, 
he concluded, withholding them was itself a criminal act.149  
Solicitor-client privilege may be breached in cases where 
disclosure is necessary for the lawyer to defend herself against 
criminal accusations. Despite the contemporary LSUC rule that “the 
lawyer owes the duty of secrecy to every client without 
exception…[which] survives the professional relationship after the 
lawyer has ceased to act for the client,” solicitor-client privilege may 
be limited where a lawyer‟s liberty is threatened by a criminal 
prosecution.150 In a pre-trial hearing to determine whether Murray 
could break his solicitor-client privilege with Bernardo to defend 
himself, Gravely J, after weighing both Bernardo and Murray‟s 
interests, held that “there is no doubt that Mr. Bernardo's privilege 
must give way to the overwhelming importance of Mr. Murray's right 
to full answer and defence.”151 Gravely J held that Bernardo‟s rights 
did not disappear, but would yield “to full answer and defence as 
necessary.”152 In Murray, since both the defence and Crown positions 
related almost exclusively to communications between Murray and 
Bernardo, it would have been impossible to try to limit what could be 
introduced and thus, “the invasion of Mr. Bernardo's solicitor-client 
privilege must be extensive.”153 Despite Bernardo‟s objection that the 
violation of privilege would prejudice his pending appeal to the SCC, 
it was held that Bernardo‟s chances of a successful application were 
slim and the threat of a 10-year jail sentence if Murray were convicted 
justified the intrusion.154  
A lawyer‟s right to defend herself can also extend to the public 
forum. In September 1995, Cooper disclosed publicly that Murray had 
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not viewed the tapes because of Bernardo‟s instructions. Bernardo‟s 
then lawyer, Tony Bryant, claimed that this was a breach of privilege 
and vowed to register a complaint with the LSUC.155 Speaking publicly 
seems to be included in the allowance for full answer and defence. So 
long as the balance of the full defence outweighs the need to maintain 
the privilege, the privilege can be vitiated. Otherwise, the privilege 
remains intact. As a result, there were no further law society 
proceedings relating to this potential breach of confidence.156 Under 
today‟s Rules, this would be an acceptable breach of confidentiality 
under Rule 2.03(4)(a).157 During Murray‟s ordeal, solicitor-client 
privilege may have been broken only to the extent necessary to allow 
for full answer and defence.158 
Another limit on the expectation of confidentiality between a 
solicitor and client is engaged when the subject matter of the 
conversation falls outside of the “umbrella of solicitor-client 
privilege.”159 The tapes, suggests Professor Renke, did not fall within 
the protected sphere of communications for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice but rather, were “pre-existing non-communications.”160 
He added that the denial of privilege to objects such as the tapes that 
were “created for their own purposes, without any reference to 
obtaining legal assistance” is constitutionally sound.161 Renke 
concludes that so long as Bernardo‟s rights against illegal search and 
seizure were protected, the tapes were subject to lawful apprehension 
by the prosecution.162 Gravely J agreed, finding that “videotapes are 
not communications” and that “Murray's discussions with his client 
about the tapes are covered by the privilege; the physical objects, the 
tapes, are not.”163 Similarly, W.B. Williston and R. J. Rolls claim that 
“documents existing before litigation was conceived and not brought 
into existence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are not free 
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from the duty to produce.”164 In order to qualify for solicitor-client 
privilege, “the communication must be made in order to elicit 
professional advice from the lawyer based upon his or her expertise in 
the law.”165 Ultimately, because they predated the solicitor-client 
relationship and were non-communications, the tapes were not 
covered by solicitor-client privilege. 
Although privilege is essential to the solicitor-client 
relationship, it is not absolute. It requires that a lawyer not disclose 
any of the communications that have taken place as a direct result of 
the accused seeking legal advice. This privilege does not extend to 
communications that would constitute a criminal offense or an 
intention to commit a criminal offense and may be broken when a 
lawyer must defend herself against criminal charges. Finally, privilege 
does not attach to communications that predate the solicitor-client 
relationship or to non-communications, such as the tapes.  
 
VII 
THE SOLICITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
Allowing the solicitor-client relationship to function 
relatively freely is essential to preserving the integrity of the legal 
system. If criminal sanctions against the accused are to be seen as 
being legitimate, they must only be assessed after a full and impartial 
trial, during which the accused is given the opportunity to defend 
himself. As defendants are only rarely themselves lawyers, they often 
need to rely on the expertise of legal experts. Therefore, the 
protection of the solicitor-client relationship forms a crucial part of 
the criminal system. This analysis will now examine the importance 
of the solicitor-client relationship in the criminal sphere, 
demonstrating that interference with the trust between a lawyer and 
client has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of Canada‟s 
criminal justice system. 
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In The Symbols of Government, Yale Law Professor Thurman 
Arnold argues that the criminal trial is “the center [sic] of ideals of 
every Western government” in that it embodies the “greater 
principles which give dignity to the individual.”166 As such, “the 
notion that every man however lowly is entitled to a trial and an 
impartial hearing is regarded as the cornerstone of civilized 
government.”167  
In R v. Seaboyer, the SCC added to this idea, when Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) held that “the right of the innocent not 
to be convicted is dependent on the right to present full answer and 
defence,” which “depends on being able to call the evidence necessary 
to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the 
prosecution.”168 McLachlin J (as she then was) added that this right 
includes an “opportunity adequately to state [one‟s] case.”169 In R. v. 
Mills, the SCC affirmed this holding, calling the right to full answer 
and defence a “principle of fundamental justice” which is protected by 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.170 McLachlin J (as she then was) 
held in Mills that Seaboyer established that:  
both s. 7 [of the Charter] and the guarantee of a right 
to a fair trial enshrined in s. 11(d) are „inextricably 
intertwined‟ and protect a right to full answer and 
defence” and that this right is also connected to “other 
principles of fundamental justice „such as the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and 
the principle against self-incrimination.‟171  
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A denial of the right to full answer and defence would surely be an 
infringement of constitutionally-protected principles. Seaboyer 
suggests that if the “evidentiary bricks needed to build a defence” are 
denied, then “for that accused the defence has been abrogated as 
surely as it would be if the defence itself was held to be unavailable to 
him.”172 Thus, if part of the full answer and defence is premised on 
physical evidence, the following issues arise. 
 
A. TRUST IN THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
The integrity of the Canadian criminal system requires that 
the lawyer representing the accused be fully-informed about the facts 
of the case.173 A criminal defendant is only rarely an expert in 
criminal law, and thus is not likely to know what information should 
be revealed to his lawyer to aid in his full answer and defence.174 It 
follows logically that the accused should be free to disclose all 
relevant facts to his lawyer without worrying about self-
incrimination. As was held in by the SCC in Smith v. Jones, “clients 
seeking advice must be able to speak freely to their lawyers secure in 
the knowledge that what they say will not be divulged without their 
consent.”175 This requires that the solicitor-client relationship be 
carefully protected by strict standards of privilege. Ultimately, “the 
right to counsel would be meaningless if accused persons were not 
free to communicate fully with their lawyers.”176 
Within a solicitor-client relationship, if trust in 
confidentiality is lacking, a client would likely not share important 
information with his lawyer, for fear that the Crown would discover 
this information. Without being fully-informed, a lawyer‟s ability to 
effectively defend the accused would be inhibited. Therefore, it is 
essential to the protection of the right to full answer and defence that 
lawyer-client communications be protected completely within the 
bounds of solicitor-client privilege. To allow lawyers to disclose 
information to anyone, either directly or indirectly, “would destroy 
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the benefits to be derived by accused persons from professional 
assistance.”177 The law of privilege, Professor Renke explains, is 
extended to the accused‟s right not to incriminate himself and thus, 
must also extend to lawyer-client communications. The decision to 
talk with a lawyer is not a decision to talk with prosecuting 
authorities.178 According to lawyer Rachel Fogl, “members of the legal 
community acknowledge that, without guaranteed security, an 
effective relationship between the lawyer and his client would be 
impossible, and without this relationship, the system would lie in 
shambles.”179 Any interference with privilege encourages distrust of 
lawyers by their clients, lowers the efficacy of representation, and 
damages the administration of justice. In Murray‟s case, forcing the 
disclosure of the tapes arguably undermined his role as an advocate. In 
fact, if lawyers must promote the administration of justice, they must 
also work to avoid distrust between themselves and their client.180 
Compelling the disclosure of evidence is at obvious odds with this 
idea, even if it is required, at present, by law. If clients cannot trust 
that the communications with their lawyers are absolutely secure, no 
such disclosure will occur. 
If a lawyer is to effectively represent a client in a criminal 
trial, it may be necessary to take possession of physical evidence. 
According to Renke, the accused has the right to have inculpatory 
evidence assessed by his lawyer and has no obligation to voluntarily 
provide non-privileged evidence to the prosecution. For the evidence 
to be properly assessed, it may have to pass into the hands of the 
lawyer. Renke asks: “should the mere fact that counsel obtains 
custody of the evidence for the purposes of an assessment cause a 
constitutional transformation, so that now counsel has the immediate 
obligation to disclose the evidence to the State?”181 This would 
interfere with the accused‟s right to remain silent and would impose 
an unreasonable obligation to disclose to the prosecution, merely 
because the client is exercising his right to retain and instruct 
                                                          
177 Mackenzie, supra note 102 at 7-6. 
178 Renke, supra note 122 at 197.  
179 Fogl, supra note 140 at 190. 
180 Renke, supra note 122 at 205. 
181 Ibid. at 199-200.  
171 
 
counsel.182 Gravely J held that the tapes did, in fact, undergo a 
constitutional transformation when they were retrieved by Murray. 
Compelling the disclosure of evidence provided to an 
accused‟s lawyer with the understanding of the existence and 
paramount nature of privilege causes significant problems. As per the 
SCC in Seaboyer and Mills, the right to full answer and defence is a 
principle of fundamental justice. This right includes being able to call 
the evidence necessary to establish a defence. Moreover, to establish 
an effective defence, a lawyer must be fully-informed from the client 
about the facts of the case. Without trust that there will be no 
disclosure to third parties, it is unlikely that a client will provide all 
information or evidence relevant to his defence. Compelling the 
defence to disclose evidence produced under the belief that it is 
protected by privilege and will remain confidential undermines 
entirely the trust between the lawyer and client. 
 
VIII 
IS THERE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE? 
 As the holding in Murray confirmed, there is a duty to 
disclose physical evidence in the possession of defence counsel in 
certain circumstances. The oft-mentioned bloody knife or smoking 
gun, for example, is physical evidence that must be turned over. 
Defence lawyer Randall Martin explains that by retaining this type of 
evidence, the defence may be hiding a key piece of evidence that has 
little or no exculpatory value.183 Similarly, lawyer Earl Cherniak 
claims that counsel cannot “harbour for the safe keeping a bloody 
piece of clothing given to him by a client, where he knows or suspects 
that the clothing will be evidence on a pending charge.”184 Although 
this may force a lawyer to withdraw from the case, a lawyer has a 
duty to turn evidence that is overwhelmingly inculpatory over to the 
prosecution.185  
Save examples of bloody murder weapons, whether a duty to 
disclose exists remains unclear. Although Rachel Fogl explains that 
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“lawyers have a duty to turn over evidence relevant to a criminal 
offense,”186 Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys claims that he does 
not expect to see much evidence volunteered by the defendant.187 
Humphreys adds that although the Crown would like to see evidence, 
the defence is often under no obligation to turn the evidence over.188 
Former Ontario Attorney General David Young, however, is of a 
stronger view, believing that there is never an excuse for withholding 
evidence.189  
 The ruling in Murray that counsel may not oppose the 
legitimate seizure of evidence does not necessarily mean that there is 
a reciprocal duty to disclose the evidence to the prosecution. Gravely J 
held that “it does not follow that because concealment of 
incriminating physical evidence is forbidden there is always a 
corresponding positive obligation to disclose.”190 There is a difference, 
Gravely J maintains, between actively concealing evidence and 
holding it with a willingness to comply with a legal seizure order. 
Professor Renke agrees, suggesting that “the lack of a right to oppose 
disclosure is not equivalent to a duty to disclose.”191 He adds that 
“because the accused has the (general) right not to incriminate himself 
or herself, the accused is not obligated or has no legal duty to assist 
the State in gathering evidence against himself or herself” subject to 
the limitation that the defence cannot destroy the evidence or prevent 
the authorities from obtaining the evidence by legitimate means.192  
Alan Gold, former head of the Criminal Lawyers‟ Association, 
claims that requiring the defence to turn physical evidence over to the 
Crown would “turn the [defence] lawyer into an assistant of the 
police…[and defence] lawyers…are not part of the Crown team.”193 
Randall Martin likens the situation to the discovery of a witness that 
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could devastate the accused‟s case: “if, in private, I examined a witness 
and I find out that my client is clearly guilty, I have no obligation to 
tell the Crown or to turn over this evidence. If the Crown can‟t 
uncover it themselves, then there is no duty to turn the information 
over.”194 Similarly, lawyer Daniel Monteith considers the tapes in 
Murray to be more like a confession than a murder weapon. He claims 
that the Bernardo tapes were the “ultimate confession” and “everyone 
accepts that if a lawyer‟s client confesses, the lawyer has no duty to 
provide the confession to the Crown.”195 He adds that “the situation is 
much different from the case where a lawyer‟s client hands over the 
murder weapon. Turning over the murder weapon is not tantamount 
to a confession.”196 Ultimately, the fact that evidence may not be 
protected in any way by solicitor-client privilege does not necessarily 
confer an obligation of disclosure to the Crown. 
If physical evidence is to be disclosed, it seems that defence 
lawyers may retain evidence for a reasonable amount of time before 
turning it over. Austin Cooper claims that inculpatory physical 
evidence given to a defence lawyer during a legal consultation could 
“clearly be withheld for a reasonable period of time.”197 After the 
expiry of this period, however, Cooper claims that the lawyer should, 
“as an officer of the court, on his own motion turn the [evidence] over 
to the prosecution.”198 Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys agrees, 
claiming that “the defence can retain the evidence for a reasonably 
short period of time.”199 When the evidence is disclosed, however, the 
defence lawyer must be careful how this is done. The evidence should 
be turned over without comment or through a third party to maintain 
confidentiality.200 Consequently, the prosecution, when presenting the 
evidence, must be careful not to reveal the source of the evidence to 
the jury.201 This will help to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client 
relationship. 
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OPPOSING DUTIES OF CANDOR AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 As has been established, it is clear that lawyers have duties 
both to their clients and to the administration of justice. These duties 
pull defence lawyers in opposite directions and force them to strike a 
delicate balance. In the Murray ordeal, the balance between the 
competing obligations of candor202 and confidentiality was at definite 
odds. Unfortunately for Murray, these duties seem to have been 
mutually exclusive in certain respects. This paper will now examine 
the tension created by the competing duties faced by criminal defence 
lawyers, in an effort to demonstrate how the Bernardo case placed 
Murray in an exceptionally difficult position. 
 The competing duties of candor and confidentiality are 
extremely difficult to reconcile. The expectations of the LSUC are 
unclear, compelling lawyers to determine the relative value they will 
place on candor and confidentiality. Monroe Freedman calls this the 
“lawyer‟s dilemma,” and illustrates the contradicting expectations by 
explaining that “the lawyer has a duty to know everything, to hold it 
in confidence, and to reveal it to the court.”203 The problem is 
immediately apparent: lawyers have an obligation to be candid with 
the court; they also have a duty of strict confidentiality about much 
that is learned during the course of their professional relationship.204 
Although lawyers have a general duty not to destroy or conceal 
physical evidence of a crime, there is significant “tension…between 
that duty to not either conceal or destroy evidence of a crime on the 
one hand and a lawyer‟s duty to confidentiality on the other.”205 
Professor Renke clarifies that when a lawyer takes possession of 
physical evidence, they are tugged in opposing directions by 
competing duties: 
On the one hand, considerations of confidentiality and 
advocacy support retaining the evidence without disclosure. 
On the other hand, considerations of the lawyer‟s 
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professional independence from the client and the lawyer‟s 
relationship with the administration of justice support 
turning the evidence over to the Crown.206 
 
This was exactly the problem faced by Murray. His duty of 
loyalty to Bernardo suggested that it was in his client‟s interest to 
have the tapes emerge during the cross-examination of Homolka. 
Conversely, his obligation to the administration of justice suggested 
that the tapes should have been disclosed to the Crown. This put 
Murray in an incredibly difficult position. Randall Martin claims that 
he is “always sympathetic for Ken [Murray]”207 and K.R., in an 
editorial in Law Times, writes that “no criminal lawyer wants to be 
placed in the position in which Mr. Murray found himself.”208 
Associate Professor Benedet, who is generally unsympathetic towards 
Murray, notes that his dilemma was significant.209 Even John Rosen, 
Murray‟s replacement, took three weeks after viewing the tapes to 
decide what to do. “I think, though, that…members of the legal 
profession, understand that a lawyer‟s obligation to a client, the 
solicitor-client privilege aspect, supersedes just about every other 
obligation that we have,” commented Murray on the difficulties he 
faced.210 He added that although the public may not understand, as 
long as lawyers respect the LSUC guidelines and historical limits of 
the solicitor-client relationship, they are acting within the allowable 
bounds. According to Murray, this rule was “one that I abided by to 
the end, when I was directed to do otherwise.”211 The ultimate 
question becomes “where is the line to be drawn between counsel‟s 
duty to the administration of justice and his or her duties to the 
clients?”212 
 With little guidance on where to draw the line between 
candor and confidentiality from the Rules, lawyers are left to try to 
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find existing jurisprudence on the matter at issue213, to fend for 
themselves214, or else, they are forced to contact the LSUC for advice. 
Unfortunately, Murray‟s case served to demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of LSUC assistance during times of evidentiary 
uncertainty. After Austin Cooper‟s request for guidance on what to do 
with the tapes, the LSUC directed that the tapes be “delivered to His 
Honour Judge P. LeSage in a sealed packet.”215 On September 12, 1994 
these instructions were followed, but the LSUC‟s advice and resulting 
adjournment allowed Rosen to retain the tapes until at least October 
7.216 
 Without effective LSUC guidance, defence lawyers are 
themselves forced to determine how to balance the duties of 
confidentiality and candor. David Layton suggests that this requires 
that a lawyer determine whether and how the duty of loyalty will be 
engaged.217 When deciding where to draw the line, Monroe Freedman 
suggests that the duty of candor should be interpreted narrowly to 
avoid interfering with a lawyer‟s duty not to disclose confidential 
information to the court, either directly or indirectly.218 The holding 
in Seaboyer may help to clarify the issue. McLachlin J (as she then 
was) held that the principles of fundamental justice, including the 
right to call evidence for full answer and defence, should reflect a 
“spectrum of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader 
societal concerns.”219 This holding favours a highly contextual 
approach, where a lawyer balances the rights of the accused with the 
rights of society to determine the weight with which the conflicting 
duties should be engaged. However, there are no clear answers – 
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lawyers are forced to make a personal judgment while the defence is 
underway.  
  The balance between the competing duties of confidentiality 
and candor is difficult to achieve and led to Murray‟s struggles. He 
had duties of loyalty and confidentiality to Bernardo, which favoured 
retaining the tapes until Homolka took the stand. Conversely, Murray 
also had a duty to be candid with the court and to avoid obstruction of 
justice, which suggested that the tapes should have been disclosed. In 
attempting to achieve a very difficult balance between the somewhat 
exclusive duties, Murray decided to suppress the tapes until trial. 
Although there was little guidance available to Murray, Gravely J later 
decided that Murray‟s decision to value the duty to his client over his 
obligation to candor was wrong. Murray‟s request for direction from 
the LSUC demonstrated the ineffective guidance provided by the rules 
by themselves and suggests that lawyers are left with few options but 
to determine a course of action on their own. According to University 
of Toronto Law Professor Peter Rosenthal this “is a very tricky 
problem,” and knowing “where to draw the line is very difficult.”220 
Without guidance, the conflict between the duties of candor and 
confidentiality leaves lawyers in possession of physical evidence 
“stuck between a rock and a hard place.”221 
 
X 
THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
 Establishing and maintaining a minimum ethical standard is 
essential to ensuring that the public remains confident in the ability of 
the legal profession to self-regulate. According to K.R.‟s editorial in 
Law Times, “nothing is more important to the long-term future of the 
profession than its ethics,” and if lawyers do not keep their “ethical 
houses in order,” there will be a lack of confidence in the profession. 
The result will be “significant incursions by governments on the self-
governing nature of the profession,” such as those seen by accountants 
in the Enron affair.222 To avoid this loss of confidence, the LSUC must 
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establish minimum ethical guidelines. This helps to maintain 
confidence in the profession, and consequently, its ability to self-
govern. Not only do ethical standards have to be well-known among 
lawyers, but the sanctions for transgressions must be publicized – the 
public must see that ethical lapses will not be tolerated. According to 
Cooper, Murray faced criminal and professional sanction to maintain 
the appearance of ethical standards – he was, in essence, “a scapegoat 
to public indignation.”223  
Regardless of whether the nuances of Murray‟s duty to 
confidentiality and loyalty to Bernardo were understood by the 
public, there was a widespread belief that Murray‟s suppression of the 
tapes had solely led to Homolka‟s successful plea bargain. According 
to Lucinda Vandervort, some hold a belief that lawyers consider 
themselves to hold de facto immunity from criminal prosecution for 
obstruction of justice, which “is not in the public interest and risks 
bringing both the administration of justice and the legal profession 
into contempt.”224 Vandervort claims that the Crown‟s failure to 
appeal the Murray decision may be taken as tacit support for the belief 
that lawyers are immune from prosecution.225 Furthermore, as alluded 
to by American defence attorney Gerry Spence, there seems to be a 
public belief that in cases of horrendous crimes, accused persons do 
not deserve the full benefits of a full defence.226 It follows that there is 
also some disdain amongst the public for those who defend 
individuals accused of these crimes. As such, despite the nuanced 
ethical and legal rules allowing lawyers to suppress evidence in 
certain circumstances, the public is likely to see these tactics as 
illegitimate. In the public eye, Murray‟s actions allowed Homolka to 
negotiate a deal that halved her likely sentence from the one she 
would have received had the videotapes surfaced earlier.227 Either 
unaware or unconcerned with the subtleties of criminal defence, the 
public saw Murray‟s dealing with the tapes as a culpable act. Murray‟s 
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suppression of the tapes was not acceptable to the public and, as this 
paper has discussed, public confidence is essential to the continued 
self-regulation of the profession and the maintenance of the solicitor-
client relationship. Therefore, clear ethical guidance for lawyers is 
essential to help ensure that the problems in Murray never occur 
again.  
 
A. PERSONAL ETHICAL CODES 
Although guidelines set out by the LSUC are important, they 
cannot entirely create ethical standards for individual lawyers. 
Developing personal standards allows individual lawyers to pre-empt 
ethical problems, as opposed to relying on the LSUC to react to ethical 
transgressions. Neither the public nor the profession is well-served by 
relying on criminal or disciplinary proceedings to express ethical 
standards.228 Since the Rules cannot address every possible situation, 
Rule 1.03(1)(f) instructs that “a lawyer should observe the rules in the 
spirit as well as in the letter.”229 Although this Rule would not have 
applied to Murray (it was adopted in 2000 and amended in 2007), it 
illustrates that the Law Society recognizes the natural limitations of a 
universal code of conduct. Lawyers must develop personal ethical 
codes to address deficiencies inherent in any code of conduct. Such 
action will help the personal reputation of the lawyer and may help 
increase public confidence in the profession. 
 
B. THE FORMER RULE 10 
In Murray, Gravely J examined Rule 10230 of the LSUC 
Professional Conduct handbook, concluding that “it is of small help 
either to counsel or to clients who may believe that both their secrets 
and their evidence are safe with their lawyers.”231 The Rule read in 
part:  
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2. The lawyer must discharge this duty by fair and 
honourable means, without illegality and in a 
manner consistent with the lawyer's duty to treat 
the tribunal with candor, fairness, courtesy and 
respect. 
The lawyer must not, for example: 
 … 
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a 
tribunal or influence the course of 
justice by offering false 
evidence… suppressing what 
ought to be disclosed, or 
otherwise assisting in any fraud, 
crime or illegal conduct…232 
 
The Rule, according to Gravely J, gave Murray the belief that “he had 
no legal duty to disclose the tapes until resolution discussions or trial” 
as there is no guidance as to what “ought to be disclosed.”233 Partially 
as a result of the vagueness of the rules of professional conduct, it was 
held that Murray had a genuine belief in the legality of withholding 
the tapes. Therefore, he did not have the requisite mens rea to be 
guilty of obstruction of justice.   
 Murray‟s confusion by the imprecision of Rule 10 was shared 
by others. Gravely J refers to “extensive discussion” about how the 
Rule applies to the particular facts of the Bernardo case and held that 
there were at least 15 journals discussing the topic. He ruled that, 
although Murray had only made a superficial attempt to establish the 
parameters of his ethical obligations, had he conducted thorough 
research, he may have remained confused.234 Although Murray 
eventually contacted the LSUC for advice, he was not given any 
substantial direction because “the rules were so vague as to be useless 
to his plight.”235 LSUC Treasurer Gavin MacKenzie (then Chair of the 
Professional Regulation Committee) claimed that “the Canadian 
authorities…don‟t assist in answering the question of just where are 
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the limits of the lawyer‟s duty not to conceal evidence of a crime.”236 
Moreover, some Canadian commentators investigating a lawyer‟s 
ethical duties relating to inculpatory physical evidence “have 
complained about the serious lack of guidance provided by the 
governing bodies‟ rules of professional conduct.”237 Although 
commentators differ as to whether this confusion should have been 
used to justify an acquittal,238 there is consensus that the rules were 
unclear. 
 The expectations of ethical standards must be made well-
known and transgressions must be dealt with publicly. There seems to 
be a belief among the public that a defendant accused of horrible 
crimes should not be afforded the full protection of the law during his 
investigation and trial. The accused‟s lawyer, it follows, faces public 
criticism when nuanced legal and ethical techniques allow her client 
to escape punishment when the public has determined that that 
individual is guilty. When the ethical allowances of techniques like 
the suppression of evidence until trial are misunderstood, lawyers are 
seen as being wrong and deserving of punishment. Ethical guidance is 
important for lawyers facing difficult ethical dilemmas. The Murray 
case has, to some degree, helped to “clarify for defence lawyers what 




 Although many of the ethical and legal questions faced by 
defence lawyers in possession of physical evidence remain unclear, 
the Murray case has provided some general direction. Gravely J‟s 
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three options have left defence lawyers with some, albeit few, avenues 
when they are in possession of inculpatory physical evidence. The 
holding in Murray imparts on a defence lawyer an obligation to 
disclose evidence in her possession and a corresponding obligation to 
inform her client that the evidence may be compelled before 
accepting that evidence. In addition to the three outlined by Gravely 
J, a potential fourth option, advanced by lawyer George Carter will be 
discussed below along with the other above-mentioned options; a 
discussion of the implications of copying the tapes in Murray will 
follow. The LSUC‟s proposed rule will then be discussed and it will be 
shown that although the rule addressed many of the concerns in the 
Murray case, it faced significant opposition, leading to its demise. 
Finally, in light of the direction provided by the Murray case, advice 
for lawyers will be outlined. Although many of the legal and ethical 
questions arising from the Murray case remain unanswered, the case 
has added to the patchwork of guidance currently available to 
lawyers. 
 
A. OPTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS FROM MURRAY 
In Murray, Gravely J provided three options for lawyers 
dealing with inculpatory physical evidence. The choices range from 
an extreme option, which would require immediate forfeiture of the 
evidence to the authorities, to a limited option, which would treat all 
evidence produced during the solicitor-client relationship as 
something over which privilege could be argued.240 In the latter 
option, the defence would be obliged to disclose the existence of the 
tapes only in very limited circumstances.241 According to lawyers 
Peter Brauti and Gena Argitis, formulating a problem-free solution is 
extremely difficult, as a rule balancing conflicting duties can always 
be seen as being too one-sided.242 Gravely J, however, formulated a 
rule that strikes a balance between the extreme and limited options 
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mentioned above. It was held that Murray, once he had discovered 
the “overwhelming significance” of the tapes, was left with three 
legally justifiable options: 
(a) Immediately turn over the tapes to the 
prosecution, either directly or anonymously; 
(b) Deposit them with the trial judge; or 
(c) Disclose their existence to the prosecution and 
prepare to do battle to retain them.243 
 
Although these options eliminate the element of surprise, the defence 
has the chance to justify its case for suppression of the evidence under 
option (c). The options strike a balance between mandating that the 
tapes be turned over and allowing them to be withheld for trial. 
Murray‟s tactic of complete suppression, however, is impossible. 
  Gravely J‟s options direct that all inculpatory physical 
evidence should, at the very least, be disclosed to either the Crown or 
the trial judge. The ruling, Wayne Renke claims, would make it 
“difficult for post-Murray lawyers to claim in Murray-like 
circumstances that they believed that concealing evidence was 
lawful.”244 Cooper agrees, claiming that following Murray, defence 
counsel would have trouble contending that there is no duty to 
disclose the existence of incriminating evidence.245 The practical effect 
therefore, is that lawyers no longer have surprise as a tactical 
advantage, or as Associate Professor Benedet calls it, “defence by 
ambush,” available to them at trial.246 The options limit the difficult 
ethical and legal questions that Murray faced when lawyers come into 
possession of inculpatory physical evidence. Although having 
surrendered the “defence by ambush” tactic, criminal defence lawyers 
are now faced with less uncertainty. 
 The decision in Murray has also created a duty for defence 
lawyers to advise their clients that the possession of physical evidence 
by the lawyer might not be covered by privilege. Cooper suggests that 
post-Murray lawyers should advise their clients that inculpatory 
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physical evidence could lead to a conviction and that, if the evidence 
is turned over to the defence lawyer, there may be a legal compulsion 
to disclose the evidence to the Crown or trial judge. Therefore, 
accused persons should keep the evidence but must be advised of the 
potential for criminal prosecution if they destroy it.247 Although 
Gravely J‟s options imply a duty to warn the client about the dangers 
of turning over physical evidence, this warning can create problems. 
Cooper suggests that some clients may not be concerned with being 
prosecuted for the destruction of evidence, particularly if the evidence 
is central to serious charges, as was the case in Bernardo. Moreover, 
lawyers face the possibility of being accused of counseling the 
destruction of evidence, despite their warnings to the contrary.248 The 
options necessitate that a lawyer warns her client that her possession 
of evidence could eventually lead to compelled disclosure. 
 
B. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE JUSTICE GRAVELY RULING 
Former Ontario Judge George Carter has put forward a fourth 
option not mentioned in Murray. Carter claims that Murray could, 
and should, have “immediately viewed and forthwith returned the 
tapes to their hiding place and kept his mouth shut about their 
existence.”249 This option would have allowed investigators to return 
to Bernardo‟s residence to retrieve the tapes after their 71-day 
investigation had finished, thereby circumventing the substance of 
the obstruction of justice problem stemming from their lengthy 
suppression. However, Carter‟s option would still render Murray a 
witness to the location of the tapes, if they were discovered and 
presented in trial. As a result, Murray would have had to recuse 
himself from the case and could be called to testify against his former 
client. A similar problem would occur if Murray had copied the tapes 
(as he did in May 1993)250 and returned them to their original location 
in Bernardo‟s home. Although this would have allowed Murray to 
retain the tactical advantage of surprising the Crown during 
Homolka‟s cross-examination, it could again result in his being called 
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as an evidentiary witness, given that he knew the location of the tapes 
in Bernardo‟s home.  
 
C. THE LSUC‟S PROPOSED RULE 
Although Gravely J‟s holding in Murray illuminates some of 
the issues faced by defence lawyers in possession of inculpatory 
physical evidence, there is a need for further clarification from the 
LSUC. In the statement dropping the professional misconduct 
complaints against Murray, the LSUC announced that it would draft a 
new rule for the handling of incriminating evidence that would be 
beneficial to both sides.251 The need for the rule was apparent. 
According to Murray, “if it ever comes up in the future, other lawyers 
won‟t have the same difficulties wallowing through an unknown 
field” if there was a new rule.252 According to LSUC Professional 
Regulation Committee member Clayton Ruby, “the committee will 
look at how to make guidelines that are clear enough so that even the 
dumbest lawyer on Earth will be able to figure out you can‟t do 
this.”253 Of course, all lawyers should refer to existing jurisprudence as 
well, as Rosen did and Murray did not.254 K.R.‟s editorial in Law Times 
claimed that it was vitally important that the benchers of the LSUC 
work to provide guidance on the issue of inculpatory physical 
evidence.255 Similarly, Gail Cohen claimed that the LSUC needed to 
bring about changes to provide guidance to lawyers facing this 
dilemma.256 Bowing to the pressure of its membership and the 
comments on the lack of guidance made by Gravely J, the LSUC‟s 
Special Committee on Lawyer‟s Duties with Respect to Physical 
Evidence Relevant to a Crime developed a proposed rule in 2001.257 
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The LSUC‟s proposed rule recognized the conflict between a 
lawyer‟s duties to a client and to the administration of justice, 
directing that any lawyer who comes into the possession of physical 
evidence should seek the advice of senior counsel or the LSUC. The 
proposed rule, to apply to all non-privileged evidence, read as follows:  
4.01(10) A lawyer who is asked to receive or does receive 
from a client or another person on behalf of a client 
physical evidence relevant to a crime shall not 
(a) counsel or participate in the concealment of the 
evidence, or 
(b) destroy, alter or otherwise deal with the 
evidence or permit the evidence to be dealt 
with in a manner which the lawyer reasonably 
believes 
(i) may lead to its destruction or alteration, 
(ii) poses a risk of physical harm to any 
person, or 
(iii) may otherwise lead to an obstruction 
of justice.258 
 
The commentary accompanying the proposed rule recognized that 
“[a] lawyer owes duties of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her 
client and must act in the client‟s best interests by providing 
competent and dedicated representation.” However, “[a] lawyer also 
owes duties to the administration of justice, which require, at 
minimum, that the lawyer not violate the law, improperly impede a 
police investigation, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.”259  
The rule contained a handful of exemptions that would allow 
lawyers to retain evidence in certain circumstances. According to 
Committee member Todd Ducharme, the exemptions were vital to 
allow defence lawyers to represent their clients without 
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compromising the clients or violating solicitor-client privilege. Before 
using an exemption, lawyers would have to obtain the consent of the 
Evidence Review Committee.260 Lawyers could temporarily withhold 
evidence under five circumstances:  
1. To avoid future harm;  
2. To prevent destruction of evidence;  
3. To make arrangements to transfer evidence to 
authorities pursuant to instructions;  
4. To examine or test the evidence; and  
5. To make effective use of evidence at trial.261  
 
The ability to temporarily withhold evidence is similar to the 
American Bar Association‟s Code of Conduct for defence lawyers.262 
The Committee was absolute in its opposition to a rule that would 
compel all evidence to be turned over to the Crown.263 It addressed 
the significant problems arising in Murray and struck a compromise 
between prosecutors and defence lawyers, without requiring that all 
evidence be surrendered without question. Instead of being embraced, 
however, the rule faced vehement opposition. 
 
D. OPPOSITION TO THE LSUC‟S PROPOSED RULE 
Despite incorporating elements designed to strike a 
compromise between the duty to clients and to the administration of 
justice, the proposed rule faced significant opposition. Much of the 
resistance came from prosecutors and the police, who felt that the rule 
allowed for the inappropriate suppression of evidence. Former 
Ontario Attorney General David Young claimed that even the 
temporary concealment of evidence can be seen as the obstruction of 
justice and “that a rule of professional conduct of the Law Society of 
Upper Canada would purport to sanction such conduct is nothing 
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short of scandalous.”264 Prosecutors and the Attorney General took the 
position that there is never an excuse to withhold evidence from the 
authorities265 and the proposal allowed for evidence to be suppressed 
for significant periods of time.266  Consequently, David Young 
considered overriding the rule if it was adopted.267  
The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (“OACP”) also 
opposed the proposal, claiming that it would not have provided 
sufficient guidance to cause Murray to “act as Mr. Justice Gravely 
ruled he ought to have acted.”268 Going further than merely failing to 
provide guidance, the OACP added, that “the draft Rule would have 
actively led Mr. Murray to [make a] decision that the Court found to 
be criminal acts.”269 The OACP claimed that, under the proposed rule, 
the tapes could have been protected from disclosure by solicitor-client 
privilege or could have been returned to Bernardo‟s house until the 
house was destroyed.270  
There were also concerns about seeking the advice of the 
LSUC without disclosing the evidence to the prosecution. Asking the 
LSUC to review the evidence without disclosing it to the prosecution 
deprives the Committee of the prosecution‟s opinion on the 
allegations. The Committee would not be told of any plea negotiations 
that were occurring with a co-accused, nor would information arising 
out of the ongoing investigation be presented. Therefore, the concern 
was that “the [C]ommittee will not possess sufficient information to 
ensure that the administration of justice is not harmed by the 
withholding of evidence.”271 There was also opposition to the drafting 
of a bright line rule in these situations by defence lawyers.272 Despite 
the LSUC‟s efforts to cater to the competing interests of prosecutors 
and defence teams, opposition to the proposed rule was strong. 
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Consequently, the rule was never adopted and lawyers facing ethical 
dilemmas involving inculpatory physical evidence remain without 
strong guidance in the Rules. 
 
E. ADVICE FOR LAWYERS 
The failure to draft rules to help lawyers facing problems with 
physical evidence has left defence lawyers in a state of uncertainty 
relating to the possession of physical evidence. Some guidance, 
however, does emerge from the Murray case. According to Gavin 
Mackenzie, “the overwhelming lesson [from the Murray case] is that 
generally speaking, you shouldn‟t take possession of property that‟s 
related to an offense.”273 Indeed, Randall Martin feels that “Murray 
should never have come into possession of the tapes.”274 University of 
Toronto Law Professor Kent Roach states that “this whole sorry 
episode would have gone no further” if Murray “had simply refused to 
go and get the tapes.”275 If a client will not disclose the contents of the 
evidence that they are instructing their lawyer to collect, Martin 
claims that the lawyer should not retrieve it. He adds that the 
evidence “already…sounds like something that I don‟t want to have” 
and that Murray happened to get Pandora‟s Box.276 Crown Attorney 
Ian Scott claims that after Murray, it would be hard for defence 
lawyers to argue that suppression of inculpatory evidence would not 
be a crime.277 Clayton Ruby, a member of the Committee that drafted 
the proposed rule, claims that although there is no problem in keeping 
secret exculpatory evidence for use at trial, there “is grave danger in 
taking possession or control of evidence that is useful to the 
Crown.”278 Therefore, lawyers should be very careful before taking 
possession of any item of evidence. Although there is still significant 
uncertainty relating to physical evidence, defence lawyers should act 
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cautiously and remember that “if you don‟t want to have to turn the 
evidence over, don‟t come into possession of it.”279 
 
XII 
THE CURRENT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
  Although adopted after the completion of much of Murray‟s 
ordeal and having undergone several amendments since, today‟s Rules 
provide only partial guidance on many of the issues faced by Murray. 
The provisions relating to physical evidence are characterized by 
general language, often only hinting at what is expected of lawyers. 
Conversely, the rules relating to confidentiality and the duties owed 
by lawyers both to clients and the administration of justice are quite 
clear. This analysis will now examine the rules relating to the 
suppression of evidence, client confidentiality, duties to the client, 
and the duty to the administration of justice.  
As could be expected from the failed rule proposal, the Rules 
contain very little about withholding physical evidence relating to a 
crime. Rule 4.01(2) contains the most direct guidance for lawyers 
dealing with physical evidence. That Rule instructs that “when acting 
as an advocate, a lawyer shall not…(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a 
tribunal or influence the course of justice by…suppressing what ought 
to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal 
conduct.”280 As was noted in Gravely J‟s discussion of the former Rule 
10, there is no indication as to what “ought to be disclosed.” This rule, 
therefore, offers little in the way of guidance to lawyers dealing with 
questions involving the possession of physical evidence.  
The definition of “professional misconduct” is also ambiguous, 
yet it could be interpreted to speak to problems of suppressing 
physical evidence. “Professional misconduct” is defined in Rule 1.02 as 
professional conduct that tends to bring discredit on the profession, 
including “(e) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”281 As was demonstrated in the previous 
discussion, it is possible to interpret the suppression of physical 
evidence in certain situations as being prejudicial to the 
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administration of justice. However, it was also shown that the 
suppression of evidence in order to mount a defence for a client may 
actually uphold the administration of justice. The guidance provided 
by Rules 4.02(e) and 1.02 is ambiguous and provides little help when 
lawyers face the issue of possession of physical evidence.  
The rules relating to client confidentiality, however, are much 
clearer. Rule 2.03(1) instructs that  
a lawyer at all times shall hold in strict confidence all 
information concerning the business and affairs of the 
client acquired in the course of the professional 
relationship and shall not divulge any such 
information unless expressly or impliedly authorized 
by the client or required by law to do so.282 
 
The Rule‟s commentary does allow for confidentiality to be broken, 
but only when there is an immanent risk of death or serious bodily 
harm to an identifiable person, when a lawyer is accused of 
wrongdoing (criminal, civil, or professional),283 or “when required by 
law or by order of a tribunal of competent jurisdiction.”284 In these 
cases, a lawyer must not disclose more information than is required. 
This Rule recognizes the importance of lawyer-client confidentiality, 
declaring that “the client must feel completely secure and entitled to 
proceed on the basis that, without any express request or stipulation 
on the client's part, matters disclosed or discussed with the lawyer 
will be held in strict confidence” and that “confidentiality and loyalty 
are fundamental to the relationship between a lawyer and client.”285 
There is no ambiguity that the duty to maintain confidentiality is 
nearly absolute. There are questions however, as to whether the tapes 
in the Bernardo case would qualify as “information.” In the Rules, the 
words „information‟ and „evidence‟ are used in ways that demonstrate 
that they are not necessarily synonymous and therefore it is unclear 
whether the tapes would have been protected.286  It is clear that 
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lawyers have an almost absolute duty to hold in strict confidence any 
information that arises from the lawyer-client relationship. 
 The Rules are also clear that the lawyer has a duty to the 
client. Rule 4.01(1) holds that “when acting as an advocate, a lawyer 
shall represent the client resolutely and honourably within the limits 
of the law while treating the tribunal with candor, fairness, courtesy, 
and respect.”287 In a defence role, a lawyer has a duty to protect her 
client from being convicted “except by a tribunal of competent 
jurisdiction and upon legal evidence sufficient to support a conviction 
for the offence with which the client is charged.”288 Moreover, a 
lawyer should never waive her client‟s rights; the commentary 
mentions that, save legal compulsion, the lawyer should never “assist 
an adversary or advance matters derogatory to [her] client's case.”289 
Therefore, a lawyer has a clear duty to represent her client fully and 
loyally. In his defence of Bernardo, it is reasonable to believe that 
Murray would have interpreted this Rule as allowing for the 
suppression of the tapes until trial, although a closer consultation with 
the existing jurisprudence may have lead him to a different 
conclusion.290 He has a clear duty both to avoid helping the Crown 
and to represent his client resolutely.  
 The Rules also set out clear duties to the administration of 
justice. Rule 4.06(1) instructs that “a lawyer shall encourage public 
respect for and try to improve the administration of justice” and Rule 
4.01(1) mandates that the lawyers treat the tribunal with candor and 
fairness.291 Lawyers must be committed to the concept of equal justice 
for all within an impartial system. Moreover, without the respect of 
the public, the legal system could not function and thus, “constant 
efforts must be made to improve the administration of justice and 
thereby maintain public respect for it.”292 To this end, Rule 6.01(1) 
dictates that “a lawyer shall conduct himself or herself in such a way 
as to maintain the integrity of the profession” such that public 
confidence in the administration of justice is not eroded.293 This Rule, 
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however, would have done little to help Murray. The vague language 
surrounding the duty to the administration of justice could have been 
construed so as to permit the suppression of the tapes. As was shown, 
Murray felt that “no matter…how egregious his crimes,” Bernardo 
was “entitled to good counsel that will defend him to the best of their 
ability.”294 According to Murray‟s defence strategy, the suppression of 
the tapes represented a significant part of Bernardo‟s defence and 
thus, arguably helped to further the administration of justice. 
Although there is a clear duty to the administration of justice, this 
duty could be interpreted in a manner that would have allowed the 
suppression of the tapes. 
 Even though today‟s Rules provide some direction with 
respect to the problems Murray faced, lawyers are left with little 
guidance on certain issues, at least by the Rules themselves. As was 
shown, the rules relating to incriminating physical evidence do little 
to help lawyers facing this situation. Despite the problems with the 
language identified by Gravely J, lawyers are simply directed not to 




 In the early-1990s, Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka 
committed unthinkable crimes. Their subsequent prosecutions did, 
however, reignite debates over the issues faced by criminal defence 
lawyers as they attempt to balance competing duties to clients and to 
the administration of justice. This balance is extremely difficult to 
achieve, especially with the minimal ethical and legal guidelines 
available to lawyers today. Despite all of the discussion, Murray 
changed very little for defence lawyers. 
 The impetus behind Murray‟s obstruction charge was that had 
he disclosed the content of the tapes, the Crown would not have 
agreed to the lenient plea bargain with Homolka. In so doing, he 
seemed to obstruct the course of justice. But when examining his 
tactical use of the tapes, Murray‟s guilt could not easily be determined 
given the ambiguity inherent in the professional and legal guidelines 
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available to him at the time. Despite the fact that the tapes may have 
harmed Bernardo‟s case, Murray had a justifiable reason for 
withholding the evidence.  
Following Murray‟s acquittal, the LSUC recognized its lack of 
guidance on the issue, established a committee to draft a proposed 
rule, and withdrew the charges of professional misconduct against 
Murray. By the end of 2000, Murray had emerged from the Bernardo 
affair having avoided criminal and professional sanction, with new 
LSUC guidelines to come.  
 Once retained, lawyers have several duties to their clients. 
They have an almost absolute duty of loyalty, which requires that a 
lawyer do everything under the law to represent her client as fully as 
possible. As officers of the court, however, lawyers also have a 
potentially conflicting duty to the administration of justice. This is a 
duty owed to society as a whole, which requires that the lawyer treat 
the court with candor, not to lie or present deceptive evidence. 
Adherence to these somewhat mutually-exclusive duties gave rise to 
many of the problems faced by Murray. 
 The duty of confidentiality is inextricably linked to solicitor-
client privilege and imposes a positive obligation on the defence 
lawyer to maintain silence and to refrain from helping the 
prosecution in any manner. The limits of confidentiality restrict 
solicitor-client privilege from applying to criminal acts or intentions, 
or non-communications that pre-date the lawyer-client relationship. 
The applicability of these limits to physical evidence was then 
discussed. It was demonstrated that privilege does not apply to 
inculpatory physical evidence, as per the judgment of Justice Gravely. 
This finding posed a particular problem for Murray. Since the tapes 
were not protected, he did not have any legal justification to suppress 
them for use in the trial. Ultimately, although Murray was under the 
impression that he was acting lawfully, his suppression of the tapes 
was not protected by privilege and thus, was unlawful. 
 The importance of integrity to the criminal system was 
discussed and it was shown that this requires that every accused 
person be given an opportunity to defend herself at an impartial trial. 
Relying on Seaboyer and Mills, it was shown that the accused is 
entitled to full answer and defence to protect herself from criminal 
conviction. To exercise this right, the accused must be able to inform 
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her lawyer fully as to the facts of the case. Clients, it was suggested, 
will not disclose all of the relevant facts unless there is absolute faith 
that the information entrusted to the lawyer will remain strictly 
confidential. Furthermore, developing a full defence may require 
possession of physical evidence by the lawyer. Therefore, requiring 
that evidence in the lawyer‟s possession be disclosed or turned over 
has the potential to undermine the relationship between the defence 
lawyer and her client. This has the practical effect of denying the 
accused the opportunity to have all relevant information assessed by 
the lawyer, raises serious questions, and threatens the integrity of the 
criminal system.  
 Perceptions of a duty to disclose were then discussed and it 
was shown that perhaps the biggest challenge facing Murray was 
uncertainty surrounding whether or when there was a duty to 
disclose evidence to the Crown. Some evidence, such as the oft-
mentioned smoking gun, clearly must be disclosed. With other 
evidence, such as the tapes in the Bernardo case, the obligations are 
much less clear. Some feel that there is rarely a duty to disclose, while 
others feel that evidence cannot be suppressed under any 
circumstances. Although there is no duty to aid in the investigation 
against their client, Murray demonstrates that lawyers face confusion 
about when physical evidence must be disclosed. Ultimately, it was 
demonstrated that there is a need for the LSUC to provide a definitive 
statement on physical evidence, and remove the need for lawyers to 
have to rely upon the existing jurisprudence. 
 This paper then discussed the conflict between candor and 
confidentiality, which caused major problems for Murray in his 
defence of Bernardo. Murray had an unquestionable obligation to 
loyalty and confidentiality, which suggested that the tapes should 
have been suppressed for use at trial. Conversely, Murray also had a 
duty to be candid with the court and to avoid obstructing justice, 
which favoured disclosure of the tapes. Although Murray‟s decision to 
suppress the tapes was later determined to be unlawful, it 
demonstrates the difficult situation lawyers face when they take 
possession of physical evidence. Moreover, the guidelines and advice 
provided by the LSUC failed to provide clarity. Ultimately, without 
guidance, lawyers trying to balance the duties of confidentiality and 
candor are often left in a difficult position. 
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 When Murray was faced with his ethical dilemma 
surrounding the tapes, guidance was essential. Unfortunately, this 
guidance was almost entirely lacking. Guidance is essential if lawyers 
are to maintain minimum standards of ethical practice. Without these 
standards, the legal profession may lose the confidence of the public, 
which is vital to self-regulation. The consensus among the legal 
community was that there was an overwhelming lack of guidance for 
Murray as he struggled with the tapes.  
 The Murray judgment helped to clarify some of the questions 
arising when defence lawyers take possession of physical evidence. 
Gravely J provided three legally justifiable options when defence 
lawyers face the problem of physical evidence, mandating disclosure 
and potential surrender of the evidence. As a result of the duty to 
disclose the evidence, there is a corresponding duty to advise clients 
that the lawyer‟s possession of the evidence may lead to it being 
turned over to the Crown. As was discussed, this is likely to have the 
practical effect of denying the accused the right to have their cases 
fully interpreted by lawyers and may lead to the destruction of 
evidence by the client. It was shown that other options, such as 
returning the evidence after it has been viewed and possibly copied, 
carry with them inherent problems. There was and is a need for a 
definitive statement by the LSUC. However, due to the lack of 
guidance, defence lawyers are well-served to avoid taking possession 
of any inculpatory evidence.  
 Finally, the current Rules of Professional Conduct were 
examined as they applied to the problems raised in the Murray case. It 
was demonstrated that there is still an incredible void with respect to 
rules relating to physical evidence. Lawyers are advised to disclose 
“what ought to be disclosed,” despite a lack of clarity as to this 
phrase‟s meaning. The rules relating to confidentiality, duty to clients, 
and the duty to the administration of justice are clearer. Lawyers owe 
an almost absolute duty of confidentiality to the information that is 
obtained during the course of the lawyer-client relationship. 
Similarly, there is a duty to resolutely and loyally represent the client, 
within the confines of the law. Lawyers also have a duty to the 
administration of justice, including treating the court with candor and 
respect. These duties, however, are open to wide interpretations and 
therefore, are of limited use when lawyers face tough ethical issues. 
As was shown, it would not be unreasonable for Murray to have 
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justified his defence of Bernardo under today‟s Rules. Therefore, to be 
of real use to lawyers in times of ethical dilemmas, further 
clarification is required. 
 Kenneth Murray faced an incredibly difficult dilemma in his 
defence of Paul Bernardo. Murray interpreted his duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality broadly, using them to justify the suppression of the 
tapes for 17 months. As was accepted by Gravely J, it was Murray‟s 
intention to use the tapes to undermine the credibility of Homolka as 
a witness during Bernardo‟s trial. Due to the lack of clarity in the rules 
respecting his duty to the administration of justice and disclosure, and 
Murray‟s lack of research into his obligations as articulated in the 
existing case law, Murray did not feel that the suppression of the tapes 
was at odds with his obligations. Thus, in addition to having no 
knowledge of Homolka‟s plea bargain, Murray did not have any 
reason to turn the tapes over to the Crown. However, when the tapes 
became known, he was widely criticized and faced both criminal and 
professional sanctions. His case highlighted the need for significant 
improvements in the guidelines given to lawyers facing similar 
circumstances, as well as the need for lawyers to engage in thorough 
case law research to assist them in clarifying their obligations. Despite 
substantial debate and effort by the LSUC, no changes were made and 
no guidance provided. Murray‟s case ultimately achieved very little. 
Today, a lack of guidance remains and defence lawyers are left with 
little help.  
It is unfortunate that, despite the efforts of the LSUC and 
Justice Gravely‟s decision, lawyers are still left without complete 
guidance on how to handle physical evidence brought to them by a 
client that is relevant to a criminal proceeding. Encouraging 
disclosure is a simple answer that tips the scale of justice too far to the 
side of the prosecution, ignoring the rights and privileges afforded to 
an accused and her relationship with her counsel. In the end, much 
more must be done to ensure that we as a society do not ignore the 
value we place on our confidences or the trust we place in our legal 
system. The rights of the accused and the desire to uphold the 
administration of justice will always be in conflict.  However, it is 
wrong to assume that enough has been done to better the balance 
between our individual rights and our societal goals.   
